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ABSTRACT
To live in a nomos—a norm-generating community—is to
understand the norms that are expected of us; to honor our credible commitments to other members of the community; and to
share the values, the goals, and even the myths, histories, and
stories of the community. For millennia, humans have used narratives, or stories, to communicate norms and values designed to
spur the communities they inhabit to solve collective action
problems by encouraging their members to trust and to be trustworthy. To do so, we have used a range of tools, media, and settings for those communications, from oral histories and cave
drawings to television and Twitter. Indeed, today, new digital
tools enable human communication and cooperation in ways
never before imagined, opening the possibility that collective will
can be harnessed to solve collective action problems by generating narratives and norms of cooperation and trust.
This Article attempts to explore the potential consequences
of these new forms of digital networks as methods for establishing trust and cooperative action. This action is essential for solving some of the greatest challenges the world faces. Such
challenges are, by their nature, difficult to solve without meaningful cooperation and engagement of individuals and the net* Professor of Law, Albany Law School. J.D., Yale Law School. B.A., Fordham
University. Formerly the Associate Director of the Urban Justice Center, a Skadden Fellow at the Legal Aid Society of New York, and law clerk to the Hon. Constance Baker Motley, Senior U.S. District Court Judge for the Southern District of
New York. The author would like to thank Mary Ann Krisa, my research assistant,
and Sherri Ann Meyer, my legal assistant, for their contributions to this work and
Sarah Hill Rogerson for helpful comments on a prior draft. I would also like to
thank the editorial team at the Dickinson Law Review, whose insightful comments,
thoughtful edits, and considerate patience have helped to strengthen this piece.
All errors and omissions are, however, only the fault of this author.
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works and the normative communities in which they are
embedded. Today we have new tools, new ways of communicating and connecting, and new modes of world-building and narrative-telling that could help create new norm-generating
communities that facilitate cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness. This Article explores if today’s digital networks can manufacture a new form of networked trust, what sociologists call
“social capital,” that can help generate cooperation and spur collective action. In other words, this Article asks whether this new
form of social capital, what I will call “synthetic social capital,” is
as effective as traditional forms of social capital in communicating norms of trust and if it is durable enough to spur and facilitate cooperation for solving collective action problems.
I will argue here that social capital that is generated through
digital networks holds out the promise of creating the trust and
fostering the cooperation that is required to address collective
action problems. These tools are thus part of the norm-generating capacity—the nomosgenerative nature and narrative-creating
infrastructure—at the disposal of communities seeking to create
the trust and cooperative values necessary to solve collective action problems. I will show that this synthetic social capital generates many of the same benefits of traditional social capital.
What’s more, I will argue that it is in a better position to facilitate
the type of coordinated action that is necessary to activate such
social capital to address problems of collective action in a cooperative fashion. While some social capital theorists, like Robert
Putnam, argue that modern technology, like the television, has
played a role in the reduction of social capital and the destruction
of networks through which social capital can flow, I argue otherwise. New technologies, like the Internet and mobile communications, have the capacity to create broad networks of trust. They
thus offer hope that such networks will not just generate—but
also coordinate—social capital, which can, in turn, spur the cooperation necessary for addressing collective action problems.
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INTRODUCTION
To live in a nomos—a norm-generating community—is to understand the norms that are expected of us; to honor our credible
commitments to other members of the community; and to share the
values, the goals, and even the myths, histories, and stories of the
community.1 For the late Robert Cover, no norm-generating com1. As Cover explained, “[t]o inhabit a nomos is to know how to live in it.”
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1983). He continued:
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exist apart from the narratives
that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic,
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munity or the institutions it creates “exists apart from the narratives
that locate it and give it meaning.”2 For millennia, humans have
used narratives or stories to communicate norms and values
throughout the communities they inhabit, using a range of tools,
media, and settings for those communications, from oral histories
and cave drawings to television and Twitter. These norms and values are communicated through networks in which individuals are
embedded as well as the other ways in which they are connected to
others: i.e., not just by their physical proximity and social relationships, but also through their ability to communicate and share,
shame, and even ostracize. These norms are communicated
through the stories told about themselves and others.3 Norm generation cannot take place outside of the nomos it occupies and no
nomos can exist without a network through which communications,
narratives, and social cues can flow.4 Networks are thus the building blocks of norm-generating communities.
Such networks are all around us, from the institutions in which
we work and play to the digital tools we use to communicate. We
are embedded in networks. These networks provide benefits to us
for each decalogue, a scripture. Once understood in the context of the
narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules
to be observed, but a world in which we live.
Id. at 4–5.
2. Id. at 4.
3. Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling: Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2414 (1989) (“[S]tories build
consensus, a common culture of shared understandings, and deeper, more vital
ethics.”). See also Marshall Ganz, The Power of Story in Social Movements, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association (Aug.
2001) (unpublished comment) (on file with Harvard University), http://marshallganz.usmblogs.com/files/2012/08/Power_of_Story-in-Social-Movements.pdf
(describing the role of storytelling in movement building); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Essay, Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 624–25 (1994) (discussing the
value of storytelling for community building in the context of the promotion of
LGBTQ rights); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men,
46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 516–17 (1992) (same).
4. Jürgen Habermas’s notion of “worldview” is similar to Cover’s nomos. For
Habermas, the worldview “function[s] in the formation and stabilization of identities, supplying individuals with a core of basic concepts and assumptions that cannot be revised without affecting the identity of individuals and social groups.”
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOL. 1: REASON
AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 64 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
There is a vast literature on the role of narrative and its norm-generative and jurisgenerative capacity. Representative scholarship includes, for example, Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law
and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387 (1993). On the three components of narratives, see Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 197, 200 (1995).
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that offer real value and richness to our lives, advance our careers,
spur business arrangements and innovation, encourage our participation in social change efforts, communicate narratives and myths,
and bring emotional connection. In short, they foster the type of
trust that facilitates human interaction and, ultimately, cooperation.
It is the human capacity for cooperation that is essential for human
advancement and survival. And such cooperation is often manifest
not just in the activity of two individuals working together, but in
the actions of collectives of individuals: in networks. It is across
these networks that the stories, norms, and narratives are communicated and shared, and which, in turn, both shape us and are shaped
by us.
Over the arc of human history, human networks—from tribes
to armies—were facilitated by and facilitated trust. That trust was a
product, until only recently over the grand span of human history,
mostly of face-to-face interactions and communications. In the
early days of globalization, when sailing ships and trade routes
crossed the world, the first trust networks that arose enabled longrange business relations. Today, we have digital tools that enable
human communication and cooperation, networks that may or may
not be facilitated by, and may or may not generate, trust.
What are the potential consequences of these new forms of
digital networks for trust and cooperative action, action that is essential to solving some of the greatest challenges the world faces,
challenges that are, by their nature, difficult to solve without meaningful cooperation and engagement of individuals and the networks—indeed, the nomoi—in which they are embedded? These
types of problems—think climate change, economic inequality, the
preservation of the rule of law and democracy, to name just a few—
are what are known as collective action problems.5 They are
problems that require collective solutions that must be facilitated
by trust and cooperative action. And to solve such problems, we
need to activate nomoi that produce narratives of cooperation,
trust, and other-regarding, behavior. These narratives generate
norms that encourage communities to come together to solve such
social dilemmas.6

5. See infra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
6. For a definition of norms, see, for example, Julia Y. Lee, Trust and Social
Commerce, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 139 (2015) (describing norms as “informal
rules that are not issued by courts or legislatures, nor enforced by legal sanctions,”
and arguing that norms “constrain self-interested behavior through social sanctions
such as gossip and ostracism”).
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To generate trust and cooperation, individuals must be trustworthy. To generate norms of trust and trustworthiness, we must
inhabit communities that cooperate: networks that share common
values that promote cooperation. We must create a narrative of
commitment and cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness. Theorists
have long used narratives and stories to communicate about the
human capacity for cooperation.7 For decades, the neoclassical
view of human nature held (and still holds), that we operate as
“homo economicus” or “economic man”: the rational, utility-maximizing individual who will only cooperate if she sees that it is in her
best interest to do so.8 In the collective action problem context, this
can lead to a vicious cycle that encourages selfish “free riding”: reliance on others to engage in cooperation until a community’s ability to cooperate collapses.9 But there is a different narrative a
community can embrace, one of cooperation and commitment,
shared values, and trust.10
For generations, Americans thrived in networks that facilitated
collective action and helped them reach cooperative solutions to
collective action problems.11 But contemporary critiques of American culture suggest that such communities are in decline.12 Indeed,
in his landmark work, Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of
American Community,13 Robert Putnam posited that community
7. For example, theories about property ownership have often been built
upon historical narratives and even myths. See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY
AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 25–42 (1994); Keith H. Hirokawa, Three Stories About Nature: Property, the
Environment, and Ecosystem Services, 62 MERCER L. REV. 541 (2011) (discussing
different stories about nature and the role that property law plays).
8. Richard Posner describes “economic man,” as “a person whose behavior is
completely determined by incentives.” RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 382 (1990).
9. See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
10. Carol Rose has posited that this narrative, that we can cooperate, is likely
at the heart of any system of laws: in the first instance, even the non-cooperative
had to cooperate in order to create that system of laws. ROSE, supra note 7, at
37–38.
11. For a description of associational life in America, see generally THEDA
SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN
AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE (2004). For an argument that the U.S. Constitution was a
product, in part, of a desire to solve collective action problems that the states,
under the weak Articles of Confederation, could not resolve on their own, see
Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117 (2010).
12. ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 277–84 (2000) [hereinafter PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE]
(describing decline in social capital in the U.S.).
13. Id. at 277.
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engagement was on the decline in the United States.14 This is problematic because the networked trust that flows from such community engagement, what he and others call social capital,15 can be
harnessed to solve collective action problems.16 He feared that this
decline threatened civic engagement and the possibility of cooperation that such social capital reflected. He highlighted the need for
more civic engagement to improve the capacity for individuals and
communities to address a wide range of collective action
problems.17
The “declinist” view suggests that the norm-generating networks, such as they might exist, are no longer up to the task of
transmitting ethics of trust and norms of reciprocity: they cannot
communicate a narrative of cooperation. But today we have new
tools, new ways of communicating and connecting, and new modes
of world building and narrative telling that could help create new
norm-generating communities that facilitate cooperation, trust, and
trustworthiness. This Article explores whether today’s digital networks can manufacture a new form of social capital that can help
communicate new narratives and create norm-generating communities that cooperate and spur collective action. In other words, is this
new form of social capital, what I will call “synthetic social capital,”
as effective as traditional forms of social capital in communicating
norms of trust? Furthermore, is this form of trust durable enough
to spur and facilitate cooperation for solving collective action
problems? Indeed, if trust and social capital are critical components of human flourishing and central to norm-generating communities that encourage the cooperation necessary to solve collective
action problems, are the new, digital networks capable of supplying
communities and nations with sufficient social capital to generate
cooperation and positive outcomes?
This Article explores the norm-generating and nomos-generative capacity of new, digital tools, mining the potential connection
between contemporary, digital networks, trust, and social capital. It
attempts to address the question whether such digital networks can
promote narratives of trust and facilitate cooperation in the service
of assisting communities to address collective action problems. It
explores the implications that such synthetic social capital has for
the creation of long-term solutions to such problems. I will argue
here that social capital that is generated through digital networks
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 95–133 and accompanying text.
See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 12, at 46–47.
Id. at 402–14.
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holds out the promise of creating the trust and fostering cooperation that is required to address collective action problems. These
tools are thus part of the norm-generating capacity—the nomosgenerative nature and narrative-creating infrastructure—at the disposal of communities seeking to promote the values necessary to
solve collective action problems. I will demonstrate that this synthetic social capital generates many of the same benefits of traditional social capital. What’s more, it is in a better position to
facilitate the type of coordinated action that is necessary to activate
such social capital to address problems of collective action in a cooperative fashion. While Putnam argued that modern technology,
like the television, has played a role in the reduction of social capital and the destruction of networks through which social capital can
flow,18 new technologies, like the internet and mobile communications, are creating new types of networks and offering hope that
such networks will not just generate—but also coordinate—social
capital, in turn fostering the trust and spurring the cooperation necessary for addressing collective action problems.19
To these ends, this Article is organized as follows. In Part I, I
will describe collective action problems, the role of trust in addressing them, the conditions that lead people to trust others and to be
trustworthy themselves, the relationship between such conditions
and social capital, and the role of trust and social capital networks
in addressing collective action problems. Part II introduces the notion of network science and ties together the discussion of trust,
collective action problems, and social capital. It attempts to understand the relationship of these concepts to networks. Part III explores the role that new, digital networks can play in generating
trust and social capital. Part IV investigates the role that digital
networks can play in enhancing trust and cooperation so as to address collective action problems.
Before I begin, however, a few words of caution. The arguments contained here are tentative at best, as we are just beginning
to understand the impact of social media on culture, communications, and community. They are descriptive in terms of the extent
to which they draw from the early social science research on the
question of the ability of digital media to help create social capital
and to spur cooperation, but they are also normative in attempting
to imagine the capacity of digital tools to help generate norms of
trust and cooperation. The outcome of efforts to harness digital
18. Id. at 217–46.
19. See infra Part IV.
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tools to coordinate responses to collective action problems is by no
means pre-determined. Indeed, there are many ways that, even today, social media and other means of communication are being
used to undermine trust and cooperation. Thus, what this Article
attempts to explore is capacities and possibilities; by no means are
its conclusions the only potential outcome of the introduction of
social media and other digital tools to community building and
norm generation. I hope only to offer what these tools could accomplish, while understanding that the outcomes I posit here are
not the only ones that might flow from the new world that is unfolding in the evolution of communications technologies.
I. COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS, TRUST
CAPITAL.

AND

SOCIAL

A. What Are Collective Action Problems?
Collective action problems are defined as problems that require a collective solution but in which individuals “find it difficult
to coordinate their actions to secure their group interest.”20 Ironically, while individuals might profess a desire for a particular goal
and support a group’s activities towards achieving that goal, the individual’s action within the group can undermine the success of coordinated cooperation designed to achieve that goal. If that
individual pursues a strategy of inaction, or self-interested action at
odds with the interests of the group, out of the belief that other
group members will pursue the broader interests of the group to
achieve the group’s ends, the individual’s non-cooperative actions
can undermine the prospect of the group’s success in meeting its
goals. We see this problem arise in many contexts and at many different scales. This problem can occur in a particular neighborhood
or even on a street, or a single, multi-family building, or it can occur
on a global level. If we believe others will take positive action on
behalf of the group’s interests, we may feel we are free to act, or not
act, contrary to those interests because others are pulling our
weight.21
Collective action problems are present in many different contexts. When a community seeks to reduce its use of landfills for
garbage disposal, it might try to encourage its members to engage in
the recycling of trash. While the community’s long-term interests
clearly lie with reducing the use of landfills—putting aside the envi20. KEITH M. DOWDING, POWER 31 (1996).
21. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
(describing the free rider problem).

OF

COOPERATION 221 (1984)
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ronmental consequences of overuse of landfills, landfills are simply
costly to maintain—an individual member of the community might
not want to go through the trouble of sorting his or her trash to
weed out the recyclable material. Believing that others will be
more community-minded, that individual might neglect his or her
responsibilities toward recycling, thinking that he or she will not
really make an impact on the overall harm to the environment by
failing to recycle.22 Of course, once everyone starts thinking this
way, or at least a significant number of individuals do so, the endeavor fails. Moreover, efforts to rein in such behavior—by, for
example, a public messaging effort that warns that too many members of the community are neglecting their responsibilities—could
cause more people to shirk their responsibilities, creating a downward spiral of non-cooperative behavior. For example, in one study
involving efforts to reduce the theft of fossilized wood from a forest
in California, signs were placed in the forest that asked visitors to
conserve the assets of the park. Signs also suggested that too many
guests of the park were stealing petrified wood during their visits.
The signs, however, were not effective in reducing the theft of fossilized wood and actually led to more theft of the asset.23
Recognition of this phenomenon can be traced at least as far
back as the ancient Greeks. Aristotle described it as follows:
For that which is common to the greatest number has the least
care bestowed upon it. Everyone thinks chiefly of his own,
hardly at all of common interest; and only when he is himself
concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations,
everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects
another to fulfill[.]24

In his 1965 work, The Logic of Collective Action,25 Mancur Olson challenged the then-popular view that individuals pursued their
collective interests rationally and collectively. He concluded that a
“free rider” problem poisoned activities of collective groups because individuals could rely on others to undertake the hard work
of solving problems, even when such problems required a collec22. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231,
1242–45 (2001) (describing the promotion of recycling as a collective action
problem).
23. Robert B. Cialdini et al., Managing Social Norms for Persuasive Impact, 1
SOC. INFLUENCE 3, 3 (2006).
24. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 57 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Dover Publications rev.
editor ed., 2000) (1905).
25. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
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tive, cooperative solution. But if everyone took this approach, or
there were enough free riders to undermine the positive work of
the other group members, the group effort would collapse.26
Several years after Olson first published Logic, Garrett Hardin
penned an essay for Science magazine in which he described this
problem as The Tragedy of the Commons.27 In that essay, Hardin
showed how the free rider problem could play out to undermine
cooperation and create harmful, long run consequences. An individual with access to a common pool resource could seek to capture
all of the benefits of the resource through overuse—that is, she
would seek to “internalize” them—while her interest in the shared
resource is only depleted to the extent of her percentage share in it.
The damage done to the common pool resource is what economists
call an “externality.”28 The other members of the community absorb the harm to the resource while the greedy community member
achieves all the gains of his or her overgrazing. While the long-term
consequences of such self-interested behavior is apparent—eventually, the resource will be completely depleted—each individual
community member might take a more narrow, self-interested, and
short-term view and seek to internalize all of the benefits as quickly
as possible. Moreover, once one member of the community takes
this position, the others are in a bind: do they continue to act out of
regard for the interests of the group while others not only shirk
their responsibilities, but also take advantage of the good will of
their neighbors? In such a situation, the idea of preserving the interests of the group to the detriment of one’s individual interests
becomes a tough pill to swallow, creating a race to the bottom.29
26. See id. at 60–65 (discussing how social incentives are effective for collective group action in small groups but less effective in larger groups). See also John
Brehm & Wendy Rahn, Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital, 41 AMERICAN J. POL. SCI. 999, 999 (1997) (describing
the free rider problem); David Lowery et al., Collective Action and the Mobilization of Institutions, 66 J. OF POL. 684 (2004). Lowery marshals research that shows
that Olson’s free rider problem is “less common than Olson had expected in both
laboratory settings . . . and the real world of organized interests.” Lowery, supra at
685–86 (citation omitted). However, Lowery also concludes, by conducting original research on lobbying patterns of a range of institutions in different settings,
that “Olson’s analysis of the collective action problem is more broadly applicable
than commonly allowed.” Lowery, supra at 702. Putnam calls the free rider problem the “paradox of collective action.” PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 12,
at 403.
27. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
28. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Wm. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29
ECONOMICA 371, 372–77 (1962) (defining term “externality”).
29. Hardin, supra note 27.
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Olson posited that large groups tended to fall into this sort of
race to the bottom because it is difficult to monitor the behavior of
individual members without some form of external control.30
Thomas Hobbes reached the same conclusion centuries before: the
state was necessary to protect against the “war of all against all.”31
But Olson also found that there were situations that led to greater
cooperation and helped to offset the threat of the free rider. Larger
groups were capable of collective, cooperative action when they
were set up in a “federated” structure: i.e., networks of connected,
smaller groups.32 Indeed, in such networks, smaller groups making
up a larger whole were in a better position to monitor shirking at
the local level.33
Similarly, Nobel-prize-winning economist Elinor Ostrom studied communities that seemed to address these sort of collective action problems well. The communities she identified appeared to
handle common pool resource problems of the type imagined by
Harden. She found that smaller communities, ones that met what
she called particular “design principles,” were in a better position to
manage common pool resources than others.34 She concluded that
communities that enjoyed a high degree of participation and engagement by community members in decisions about resource allocation, rule setting, and monitoring of participant behavior fared
better than larger communities that did not involve member engagement in oversight and management of the resource.35 What’s
more, she believed the advantages of smaller communities with
high civic engagement could be taken to scale where such smaller
communities became “nested enterprises.” Such enterprises are individual component parts that make up a larger network that is
geared toward collective action and cooperation at a scale larger
than the smaller community at which local decisions are made and
in which activities are carried out.36 Ostrom’s nested enterprises
are a lot like Olson’s federated groups: they are collections of
30. For many, the Tragedy of the Commons leads, inexorably, to the conclusion that the only way to protect the commons is to destroy it by instituting a
regime of private property with government oversight. See, e.g., Hardin, supra
note 27, at 1245. See also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property
Right Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 23 (1973).
31. THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN 30 (Richard Tuck & Michael
Silverthorne eds., 1998) (1651).
32. OLSON, supra note 25, at 61–63.
33. Id.
34. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 88–102 (1990).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 101–02.
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smaller institutions “nested” in larger networks that combine to
form larger systems, whether they are local, state, regional, or even
national systems.37 In short, the smaller groups are grafted onto—
that is, networked into—larger enterprises that are connected in a
living chain of smaller organizations.
But fostering cooperative, collective action is not just about institutional design. Smaller groups, even networked ones, do not
lead inexorably to cooperation. As anyone who has ever worked
on a group project in school or at work can attest, small groups
sometimes function well and produce trusting, trustworthy, productive, and cooperative members. Many times they do not. Small
groups alone do not create the conditions necessary for cooperation. Something else, in addition to the creation of smaller groups,
is essential to cooperation. Indeed, cooperation is what smaller
groups can foster, but by no means do at all times. There must be
something more than institutional design that leads to cooperation.
In responding to Olson’s theories of collective action, Dan
Kahan has suggested that Olson’s narrow view of the threat of the
free rider undermining such action neglects the role that trust and
reciprocity play in facilitating cooperation. What Kahan called the
“logic of reciprocity” can permeate group activities and it is through
trust and reciprocal, trusting actions that individuals can spur cooperative behavior.38 This logic of reciprocity—which has, as its starting point, trust—has been, for millennia, embedded in networks of
individuals that communicated by word-of-mouth and through faceto-face interactions that fostered cooperation through the federated, nested groups favored by Olson and Ostrom. Again, though,
it was not the existence of small groups alone that generated cooperative action; it was something more. Indeed, at the heart of such
institutional design, then, is something deeper, something that is
more likely to lead to cooperation: i.e., trust that leads to the logic
of reciprocity. If Kahan is correct that this logic of reciprocity is
essential to human cooperation, and trust is not just the product of
institutional design (since not all seemingly well-designed institutions lead to cooperation), what role does trust play in spurring collective, cooperative action? It is to this question that I turn next.

37. Id.
38. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 71–72 (2003) [hereinafter Kahan, Reciprocity]. See
also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–19 (1971) (arguing that reciprocity
and cooperation are at the heart of a just society).
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B. What Is the Role of Trust and Reciprocity in Solving
Collective Action Problems?
Since trust is at the heart of reciprocity, it is important to come
to an understanding of what trust itself is. Trust has been described
as “the voluntary ceding of control over something valuable to another person or entity, based upon one’s faith in the ability and
willingness of that person or entity to care for the valuable thing.”39
Trust for collective, cooperative action would seem to have a
slightly different aspect to it. The valuable thing that the trustor is
asking of the trustee is that he or she quite literally cares for nothing other than the trustor’s trust. In other words, what the trustor is
saying when he or she collaborates with another individual, or a
group of individuals, is that those individuals will not abuse his or
her trust: that they will behave in a trustworthy fashion. Central to
cooperative action, then, is trustworthiness, or at least perceived
trustworthiness: my belief that you will behave in a trustworthy
fashion—that you will not abuse my trust. So what comes first:
trust or trustworthiness? Game Theory offers us a window into
how trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation are generated, and
these findings tend to support the notion of reciprocity: that trust
begets trust and cooperation, and mistrust can also generate rent
seeking and predatory behavior.40
In a series of experiments that have been analyzed, replicated,
and reviewed in the decades since they occurred, with their findings
holding up as robust and durable,41 Robert Axelrod invited several
hundred individuals to participate in a game that utilized the popular “Prisoner’s Dilemma” problem to determine the best strategies
for generating cooperation and positive outcomes.42 The Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (“PD”), attempts to capture the essence of trust
39. Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L. J. 1457, 1461 (2005).
40. On the origins of Game Theory, see WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S
DILEMMA: JOHN VON NEUMANN, GAME THEORY, AND THE PUZZLE OF THE BOMB
(1992).
41. See, e.g., Robert Hoffmann, Twenty Years On: The Evolution of Cooperation Revisited, J. OF ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES & SOC. SIMULATION (2000) (describing
research following up on Axelrod’s work); David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7
RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 58 (1995) (describing results of meta-study of cooperation
games). See also Samuel S. Komorita et al., Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 494 (1991) (assessing effectiveness of tit-for-tat
strategies in generating cooperation in social dilemmas); Samuel S. Komorita et al.,
Reciprocity and the Induction of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 607 (1992) (providing overview of experiments concluding
that tit-for-tat strategies generate cooperation).
42. AXELROD, supra note 21, at 7–14 (describing Prisoner’s Dilemma
experiments).
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and trustworthiness to understand how individuals might cooperate
or engage in non-cooperative action in different settings.43
Researchers have used different versions of the PD experiment
to determine how trusting and trustworthy participants might be in
different situations or under different conditions. Axelrod used an
“iterated” PD game (a version of the experiment in which the parties engage in multiple transactions together with the same stakes
and incentives), to determine the optimal strategy to use in such
situations. Through this experiment, Axelrod found, time and
again, that the strategy to achieve the best outcome over the duration of the game (to induce individuals to cooperate the most
times), was “Tit for Tat”: each player mimics the prior player’s
move, either to cooperate or defect through retaliation.44 It makes
sense, then, that the best starting move is what is known as the
“trusting first move”: a cooperative, initial move by one party to
encourage and induce one’s counterpart to reciprocate in kind,
leading to a virtuous cycle of cooperation.45

43. The PD game uses a thought exercise to understand how individuals
might cooperate or engage in non-cooperative action in different settings. The PD
game asks us to imagine a scenario where two criminal suspects are being held by
the police, albeit in separate interview rooms (a scenario that should be familiar to
anyone who has ever watched a police procedural drama on television). If both
parties engage in cooperative behavior toward each other by not revealing information to the police during their respective interrogations, both suspects come out
ahead because the police will have information on neither suspect implicating
them in the crime. If one party “defects” by laying blame for the crime with the
other suspect, that defector might receive a light sentence, while the second suspect receives a more serious penalty. The reverse is true if the first suspect remains silent while the second provides information to the authorities implicating
the first. In order to achieve the optimal outcome for both—that is, lighter
sentences—both need to remain silent and trust that the other is doing the same.
For more on the PD game, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 312–13 (1994).
44. AXELROD, supra note 21, at 30–31.
45. Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 531
(1995) [hereinafter Rose, Mirror of Betrayal]. Brehm & Rahn argue that operationalizing cooperation involves “a tight reciprocal relationship between civic engagement and interpersonal trust. The more that citizens participate in their
communities, the more they learn to trust others; the greater trust that citizens
hold for others, the more likely they are to participate.” Brehm & Rahn, supra
note 26, at 1001–02. Diego Gambetta turns the trust-cooperation nexus on its
head, arguing that “trust might follow rather than precede cooperation.” Diego
Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust? in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS 225 (Diego Gambetta, ed., 1988). For Gambetta, even a “random ‘signal’ ” encouraging cooperation can then spur trust “due to the success of its consequences.” Id. at 226.
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In real-world settings requiring collective action, we see these
findings replicated.46 The behavior of others often sends messages
to us as to whether we should cooperate or defect, work collaboratively, or take short-term, self-interested actions. A study that examined the use of towels in hotels by guests showed that guests who
were encouraged to “join your fellow citizens in helping to save the
environment” were more likely to re-use their towels as opposed to
those who were asked simply to “help save the environment.”47
Similarly, hikers who were asked to stay on designated paths in a
park “in order to protect the Sequoias and natural vegetation” were
more likely to follow such directions than those who were instructed to stick to the paths despite the fact that “many past visitors have gone off” them, “changing the natural state of the
Sequoias and vegetation” in the park.48
Axelrod’s findings and those of these real-world settings reveal
that we are more likely to behave in a cooperative fashion when we
believe (i.e., trust) that others are cooperating. Unlike the model of
human nature posited by Olson—that collective action is often
doomed to failure by human nature’s calculative, self-interested
side49—a different model emerges, one sometimes referred to as
“homo reciprocans”: humans behave in a reciprocal fashion based
on the cues they are given in the world.50 Cooperate when others
cooperate but defect when it appears others may be doing the
same.51 As Kahan explains, when humans “perceive that others are
behaving cooperatively, individuals are moved by honor, altruism,
and like dispositions to contribute to public goods even without the
46. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod & Douglas Dion, The Further Evolution of Cooperation, 242 SCI. 1385, 1385 (1988) (collecting examples of tit-for-tat strategies
unfolding in natural settings) (citations omitted).
47. Noah J. Goldstein et al., A Room with a Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to
Motivate Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 J. CONSUMER RES. 472, 474–79
(2008).
48. Patricia L. Winter, The Impact of Normative Message Types on Off-Trail
Hiking, 11 J. INTERPRETATION RES. 34, 38 (2006).
49. See OLSON, supra note 25, at 61–63.
50. Samuel Bowles et al., Homo Reciprocans: A Research Initiative on the Origins, Dimensions, and Policy Implications of Reciprocal Fairness 4–5 (1997), http://
www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/homo.pdf. See generally Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gächter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of Homo
Reciprocans, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 845 (1998). Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action
and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 137, 140 (2000)
(analyzing literature on experiments in cooperation to find, among other things,
that cooperation increases over time as opportunities to cooperate also increase
and face-to-face interactions help lead to greater cooperation) [hereinafter Ostrom, Collective Action]. Ostrom, whose work I will reference throughout this Article, might call homo reciprocans a “conditional cooperator.” Id. at 141–42.
51. Bowles et al., supra note 50, at 4.
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inducement of material incentives.”52 Conversely, if individuals
“perceive that others are shirking or otherwise taking advantage of
them, individuals are moved by resentment and pride to retaliate.”53 When that happens, they “withhold beneficial forms of cooperation even if doing so exposes them to significant material
disadvantage.”54
Trust is thus at the center of human cooperation, and manifest
in one of the most basic forms of human exchange: commercial
transactions. And even these exchanges are imbued with trust, as
Nobel-prize winning economist Kenneth Arrow explains:
“[v]irtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust.”55 The acts of trust that we carry out throughout the
day help to facilitate commercial exchange and reduce transaction
costs. Economist Ronald Coase identified transaction costs into
four categories: search for partners, information about such partners, negotiation with them, and enforcement of commitments.56
Trust helps reduce these transaction costs considerably, facilitating
commercial exchange.57 But such transaction costs can also infiltrate the challenge of finding solutions to collective action problems
as well, as the search for trustworthy partners, our desire to know
more about their likely behavior, our negotiations designed to facilitate collective action, and our ability to enforce commitments related to that cooperation are all part of the collective action
calculus: the decisions we make every day whether to cooperate or
compete, collaborate or defect.58 To the extent our willingness to
trust helps to reduce those transaction costs, the more likely it is
52. Kahan, Reciprocity, supra note 38, at 71.
53. Id.
54. Dan Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 334
(2001).
55. Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357
(1972).
56. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–92 (1937).
57. Since reduced transaction costs can lead to more economic activity, research suggests that as trust increases, so does economic performance. Analysis of
the economic activity of 29 countries with market economies revealed a positive
correlation between trust and economic growth. Stephen Knack & Phillip Keefer,
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112
Q. J. ECON. 1251, 1251 (1997).
58. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Social Capital and Society 6 (IMF, Working
Paper No. 00/74, 1999) [hereinafter Fukuyama, Social Capital]. Fukuyama states:
The economic function of social capital is to reduce the transaction costs
associated with formal coordination mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, and bureaucratic rules. It is of course possible to achieve coordinated action among a group of people possessing no social capital, but
this would presumably entail additional transaction costs of monitoring,
negotiating, litigating, and enforcing formal agreements. Id. As
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that we will conduct a cost-benefit analysis that encourages us to
work collectively towards a solution to collective challenges.59
When dealing with problems that require a collective, coordinated response, trust, together with its companion, trustworthiness,
rather than legal solutions, offer the best ingredients for an effective and efficient resolution.60 Law can serve as a backstop to such
coordinated, trusting behavior,61 as a means of enforcing individuals’ commitments to one another when those commitments are
breached, but law can also serve to “crowd out” trust and trustworGambetta points out, information is essential to facilitate cooperation
and coordinated action. He writes:
The problem, therefore, is essentially one of communication: even if people have
perfectly adequate motives for cooperation they still need to know about each
other’s motives and to trust each other, or at least the effectiveness of their motives. It is necessary not only to trust others before acting cooperatively, but also
to believe that one is trusted by others. Gambetta, supra note 45, at 216.
59. For a discussion of the role of trust in reducing transaction costs, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 185 (2d ed. 1977). See
also Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1251, 1282–83 (1997).
60. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE
CREATION OF PROSPERITY 309–11 (1995) [hereinafter FUKUYAMA, TRUST] (arguing resolution of societal problems through legalistic approaches less efficient than
through trust); Brehm & Rahn, supra note 26, at 1003 (“Compliance is inefficient
when it is based on fear of authorities rather than internalized norms, because
citizens use politicians to protect them from the lawlessness of others rather than
to achieve collective purposes.”) (citations omitted); OSTROM, supra note 34, at
152 (noting phenomenon that once cooperation begins and individuals have a
stake in both devising rules and monitoring compliance, “[o]ver time, further adherence to shared norms evolves and high levels of cooperation are achieved without the need to engage in very close and costly monitoring to enforce rule
conformance”). See also Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital
Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2061 (1996) (“[I]f we could somehow
quantify potential prisoners’ dilemmas and compare those surmounted through effective norms and those through formal state laws, it seems likely that norms
would dwarf state enforcement in importance. Rational-choice scholarship has little to say about how such norms arise, but it does recognize that once they do arise
they might be self-sustaining as long as cooperation is reciprocated.”) (citation
omitted). Pildes’s argument contradicts Sunstein, who in a companion article, argues that law can step in when informal norms fail and the “goal is to reconstruct
existing norms and to change the social meaning of action through a legal expression or statement about appropriate behavior.” Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Expressive Function]. For Sunstein, law can be seen as “an effort to produce adequate social norms.” Id. It can “either do the work of such norms, or instead be
designed to work directly against existing norms and to push them in new directions.” Id. Sunstein posits further that law can “have a moral weight and thus
convince people that existing norms are bad and deserve to be replaced by new
ones.” Id.
61. Rose, Mirror of Betrayal, supra note 45, at 556.
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thiness.62 The overbearing presence of legal restrictions in otherwise cooperative settings can, ironically, send the message that
defection is the norm, hence the need for such restrictions.63 When
defection is seen as the norm, the possibility of cooperation diminishes as the logic of reciprocity can attach and individuals can look
for ways to defect out of fear that others must be doing the same:
one fears defection from others because there would be no reason
for the law to take such a dominant role in the setting if defection
was not a serious risk.64
That is not to say that punishment and the fear of punishment
have no place in preventing misconduct; nothing could be further
from the truth.65 The reliable threat of punishment for defection is
an essential element of any cooperative venture, as Axelrod’s PD
experiments showed.66 Tit for Tat was a successful strategy precisely because of the fear of retribution for non-cooperative action.
Indeed, in some iterations of the game, “two tits for a tat,” or, two
acts of punishment for each defection, quite often encouraged the
initial defector to get back in line and maintain a cooperative stance
more consistently moving forward; a more forgiving strategy deploys a tit for two tats, meaning acts of defection are tolerated to a
point before punishment is meted out.67 As Robert Ellickson
showed in his study of how ranchers settle disputes in Shasta
County, California, even informal means of punishment (including
such relatively weak forms of retribution as spreading truthful, negative gossip about a defector), carried out without knowledge of or
reference to formal legal rights or duties, are effective in spurring
collaborative action and punishing defection.68
62. On the potential role that law can play in “crowding out” trust, see Larry
E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 581–82 (2001).
63. Elinor Ostrom & T.K. Ahn, The Meaning of Social Capital and Its Link to
Collective Action, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 17, 28 (Gert T. Svendsen &
Gunnar L. Svendsen eds., 2009) (arguing that formal laws can discourage voluntary efforts to address collective action problems).
64. FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 60, at 27 (law can undermine trusting relationships); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 78–85 (1991) (law can undermine community and shared
interests).
65. As Robert Ellickson points out, certain “ground rules,” like prohibitions
against murder, are essential to cooperation. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 175–176 (1994).
66. AXELROD, supra note 21, at 51–53 (describing reasons for effectiveness of
Tit-for-Tat strategy).
67. For a discussion of different strategies in the iterated PD game, see AXELROD, supra note 21, at 45–47.
68. ELLICKSON, supra note 65, at 57. See also Gambetta, supra note 45, at
218–19 (“For trust to be relevant, there must be the possibility of exit, betrayal,
defection.”).
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While the debate between whether formal law or informal
norms is more robust for promoting order and cooperation is a
lively one, to explore it fully is beyond the scope of this Article.
What I wish to do here is simply to consider the role that trust may
play in encouraging cooperation in the service of solving collective
action problems. Norms seem more efficient in the capacity for creating cooperation in such settings than an extensive system of legal
regimes and institutions.69 Furthermore, in order to encourage individuals to engage in cooperative action, individuals must trust
those with whom they want to cooperate in the service of collective
goals.70 I will explore whether there are conditions that can help
foster trust and trustworthiness. As discussed, some research shows
that legal constraints are not always the most likely means of fostering collaboration and cooperation. Are there other conditions,
then, that can lead to trust and trustworthiness, and, in turn, set the
stage for more cooperative behavior that serves as a means of solving collective action problems that, by their nature, require a high
degree of that cooperation and where formal laws sometime fall
short? The next subsection explores this question, plumbing Game
Theory for answers.
C. What Are the Conditions that Facilitate Trust and
Cooperation?
Through the use of game theoretical problems like the Prisoner’s Dilemma described above,71 or Applied Game Theory,
through which field experiments are conducted to assess how individuals behave in real-world settings, we can gain insights into the
conditions that help to foster cooperation and those that encourage
defection.72 The results of these studies, assessed through metastudies of their outcomes, reveal a number of consistent findings,
69. Rose, Mirror of Betrayal, supra note 45, at 556 (“By its very slowness,
clumsiness, and ineffectiveness, the law remands the policing of trust to what are
often much more efficient fora: conscience, retaliation, and informal community
norms.”).
70. Gambetta, supra note 45, at 217–18.
71. See supra notes 44–81 and accompanying text.
72. For a discussion of Game Theory generally and its potential application in
different legal settings, see BAIRD ET AL., supra note 43, at 1–46. In addition to the
PD, another common experiment, sometimes called the Dictator or Ultimatum
Game, in which a sum of money is divided between participants, also involves
trust. For a description of this type of study, see William Robert Nelson, Jr., Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics: Comment, 91 AMERICAN
ECON. REV. 1180, 1181–82 (2001).
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which lead to a greater understanding of the criteria and conditions
that can lead to trust and trustworthiness.73
The first of these insights is that the more participants in these
experiments engage each other in “repeat play,” and are aware they
will do so, the greater the likelihood the individuals will cooperate
with each other.74 Probably the most salient manifestation of this
phenomenon is in the PD games administered by Axelrod.75 Indeed, it is the basis of the successful Tit-for-Tat strategy. One-off
games between casual partners who will not participate in the experiment together again, or do not think they will, are unlikely to
respond to Tit-for-Tat strategies because there is little risk of longterm consequences for defection.76 In iterated games, however, cooperation breeds cooperation and defection breeds defection.77
When someone cooperates with us we tend to cooperate with him
or her; when someone chooses to exhibit non-cooperative behavior,
we do the same.78 But central to the success of Tit-for-Tat strategy
in producing cooperation is the knowledge that one’s cooperation
will be rewarded in the future and one’s defection will be punished,
again, in the future.79
The concept of repeat play and the cooperation it can encourage appears in many different settings, from community centers and union halls to global commerce and geo-politics. Longstanding relationships in which the parties engage in multiple transactions over time lead to cooperative behavior: these interactions,
and the desire for more, encourage cooperation and trustworthy behavior.80 The retailer that seeks to cultivate long-term relationships
73. See, e.g., Sally, supra note 41, at 86–87 (analyzing results of prisoner’s dilemma games).
74. See generally Pedro Dal Bó, Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future:
Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games, 95 AMERICAN ECON.
REV. 1591 (2005); Robert Evans & Jonathan P. Thomas, Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games with Two Long-Run Players, 65 ECONOMETRICA
1153 (1997); Robert Gibbons, Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet
Repeated Games, in TRUST IN SOCIETY 332–353 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001).
75. AXELROD, supra note 21, at 11–12.
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id.; DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 65–89
(1990).
78. Ostrom, Collective Action, supra note 50, at 140 (analyzing literature on
experiments in cooperation to find, among other things, that cooperation increases
over time as opportunities to cooperate also increase and face-to-face interactions
help lead to greater cooperation).
79. Kahan, Reciprocity, supra note 38, at 73; AXELROD, supra note 21, at
113–17.
80. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643,
1657 (1996).
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with customers will engage in cooperative interactions with those
customers, eschewing short-term gains and advantages for the longterm benefits to be achieved by maintaining a durable and longlasting customer relationship.81 Cultivating these relationships,
even if costly to do so, can have a beneficial, long-term payoff.82
A second key insight about trust and trustworthiness that can
be gleaned from research on cooperation is that greater social distance between individuals increases their untrustworthy behavior
toward one another.83 We are more likely to trust those who we
perceive as being members of the same group as us, as sharing common traits.84 This trust extends even to our looks: we tend to have
greater trust for those we perceive as looking more like us than
those who do not.85 Indeed, nations with deeper divisions by race,
language, and other characteristics tend to have lower generalized
trust among their citizens than those that are more homogeneous
demographically.86
A third insight about conditions and actions that can foster
trust that these experiments typically generate is that communica81. Klein and Leffler describe how the repeat play phenomenon occurs in
commercial settings in Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market
Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POLI. ECON. 615 (1981).
82. See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90 (1990). This phenomenon is also
common in explicitly adversarial settings, like in litigation. See Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 39, 40–41 (2002). And even in war as
Axelrod showed that soldiers in “No Man’s Land” in World War I exhibited a
“live-and-let-live” strategy to a great extent in the lulls between active fighting.
AXELROD, supra note 21, at 74–82. Ellickson also found what he also called a liveand-let-live approach in Shasta County with respect to roaming livestock. ELLICKSON, supra note 65, at 53–55.
83. See Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Justice and Other-Regarding Behavior
in Dictator Games, 86 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 653, 658 (1996).
84. See ERIC M. USLANER, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST 123–24
(2002).
85. See Lisa M. DeBruine, Facial Resemblance Enhances Trust, 269 PROC.
ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1311 (2011). One study of rubber traders in
Asia in the 1960s unearthed a complex hierarchy of social relations that generated
different degrees of trust based on the extent of social distance between individuals. Those who enjoyed the most trust were those who were the closest in kin to
each other; as the bonds of kinship and knowledge of the participants became
weaker, trust diminished as well. Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. L.
STUD. 349, 349–62 (1981).
86. See generally Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey, The Sound of Silence in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator Games, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. AND ORG. 46 (1999);
Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, The Determinants of Trust, (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7621, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w7621.pdf.
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tions between partners that are meant to encourage cooperative behavior, not surprisingly, tend to lead to greater trust and
trustworthiness.87 In one early PD experiment, when subjects were
allowed to exchange notes in which they promised to cooperate in
advance of engaging in the dilemma exercise, they cooperated at a
higher rate than those participants who did not.88 In fact, studies
show that any communication between the parties, even those that
do not involve promises to cooperate, can develop a bond between
the parties, lower the social distance between them, and ultimately
lead to greater cooperation.89 As recent research shows, even unilateral communications that involve some facet of trustworthiness
can lead to more trustworthy and cooperative behavior.90 This
same research also leads to a final insight to be gleaned from research on trust and trustworthiness. Without some form of constraint—through monitoring, oversight and/or punishment for noncooperative behavior—people will cheat. These restraints can be
self-imposed, imposed by a partner in a cooperative effort, or imposed by some third party.91 Carol Rose considers the law itself as
a formal, third party constraint.92
In the iterated PD games, we see some of these constraints operating to encourage cooperative behavior. An individual might
want to be perceived as cooperative out of a sense of personal
honor, or, even if for self-interested reasons, so as to illicit the cooperative behavior of the other. In addition, the ability to punish defection through one’s own, reciprocal defection helps to keep game
partners on the straight-and-narrow. As Ellickson and others suggest, in many settings, informal, non-legal constraints can be more

87. Elinor Ostrom et al., Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible, 86 AMERICAN POL. SCI. REV. 404, 413–14 (1992) (describing effects of communication on cooperation in prisoner dilemma games); Daniel
Balliet, Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic Review, 54 J. CONFLICT. RESOL. 39, 52–53 (2010) (conducting meta-analysis of the
effect of communication in social dilemma settings and finding positive relationships between communication and cooperation therein).
88. James L. Loomis, Communication, the Development of Trust, and Cooperative Behavior, 12 HUM. REL. 305, 314 (1959).
89. Donna M. Desforges et al., Effects of Structured Cooperative Contact on
Changing Negative Attitudes Toward Stigmatized Social Groups, 60 J. OF PERSONALITY. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 543 (1991).
90. Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of SelfConcept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633, 643 (2008).
91. Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of
Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 72 (1987).
92. Rose, Mirror of Betrayal, supra note 45, at 536.
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effective in policing behavior than formal ones.93 Regardless of
which are more effective—formal or informal constraints and
norms—some type of oversight is necessary to restrain non-cooperative behavior. For example, in studies carried out by behavioral
economist Dan Ariely, people in studies involving test subjects solving math equations cheated when such cheating was easy and oversight was impossible. What they also found under these conditions
was not that a small number of people cheated a lot; rather, many
cheated, and often cheated just a little bit.94
***
These findings tend to show that there are certain conditions in
which trust and reciprocity are fostered to generate not just trustworthiness but also the cooperation that is a product of reciprocity.
Trust, trustworthiness, and cooperative behavior can arise in situations in which there is the possibility of repeat interactions between
individuals; they engage in communications designed to elicit credible commitments; social distance is low between the parties; and
there is the possibility of oversight, monitoring, and punishment for
defection and non-cooperative actions. These conditions all arise
and are embedded within networks; they appear to manifest themselves in networks of trust and reciprocity through which information about the trustworthiness of partners and the gains to be
achieved by cooperation are communicated. To spur that cooperation, trust and reciprocity are made manifest in a network that is,
itself, a sort of asset that generates real benefits to the participants
in the network. This asset is often called an individual’s “social capital,” and it is to the notion of social capital that I now turn. I hope
that the discussion of the conditions that lead to trust and cooperation, particularly in collective action settings, will help set the stage
for the discussion that follows in later Parts, which explores the role
of digital social networks in spurring collective action. Since I argue
that many of these trust conditions are manifest in settings where
social capital is high, the ability of digital social networks to generate social capital will play some role in the assessment of whether
such networks are capable of helping groups and networks solve
collective action problems.
93. Ellickson, supra note 91, at 81–90; see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AMERICAN SOC. REV. 55,
60–67 (1963) (noting that business persons generally believe that formal contracts
can be unnecessary in certain business dealings).
94. Mazar et al., supra note 90, at 641.
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D. Social Capital: Networked Trust That Facilitates Cooperation.
While James Coleman is often credited with raising scholarly
awareness about the idea that one’s trusted network of friends and
acquaintances can serve as an asset that an individual can leverage
for social and economic benefits,95 the term “social capital” was
first introduced by a West Virginia educator, L.J. Hanifan, in 1916.
Hanifan posited that an individual could form bonds with neighbors
through personal contact, cooperation, and mutual trust. Through
these interactions, those individuals will “accumulat[e]. . . social
capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which
may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community.”96
Harvard’s Robert Putnam, through his seminal work Bowling
Alone, referenced earlier, popularized the concept of social capital.97 For Putnam, “life is easier” when social capital is high in a
community.98 Why? Social capital fosters cooperation and collective action for precisely the reasons described above: it embraces
the notion of repeat play, lowers social distance, and encourages
communication and credible commitments that bring with them the
idea of both reward and, possibly, punishment in terms of a lack of
access to the future benefits of cooperation.99 According to Putnam, “[s]ocial norms and the networks that enforce them” (i.e., social capital), offer a “mechanism” for solving collective action
problems.100
95. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AMERICAN J. SOC. S95, S100–01 (1988) (describing the concept of social
capital).
96. L.J. Hanifan, The Rural School Community Center, 67 ANNALS AMERICAN ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 130, 130–31 (1916).
97. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 12.
98. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, 6
J. DEMOCRACY 65, 66 (1995) [hereinafter Putnam, America’s Declining Social
Capital]. See also Jason Mazzone, Toward a Social Capital Theory of Law: Lessons
from Collaborative Reproduction, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1998).
99. See, e.g., Ostrom, Collective Action, supra note 50, at 154 (linking repeat
play, inter-personal interactions, creation of trust, social capital, and resolving collective action problems); Brehm & Rahn, supra note 26, at 1000 (“High levels of
social capital appear to be crucial for such measures of collective well-being as
economic development, effective political institutions, low crime rates, and lower
incidences of other social problems such as teen pregnancy and delinquency.”) (citation omitted). See also Fukuyama, Social Capital, supra note 58, at 13 (noting
social capital arises from iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma games as repeat play and
other phenomena present in such games helps lead to cooperation, trust, and
trustworthiness).
100. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 12, at 288.
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Indeed, social capital consists of those “features of social organizations, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”101 Stores
of social capital help communities coordinate and communicate,
spread information about reputations for trustworthiness in a community, and help individuals and communities work collectively to
solve problems.102 Trust and cooperation are both higher in communities where social capital is high and, for Putnam, there is less
cheating in such communities because “economic and political negotiation” takes place within thick “social interaction.”103
Social capital theorists often posit that there are two different
types of social capital, with different characteristics and effects.
“Bonding” social capital is the term used to refer to the relationships that arise in closely knit groups. On the other hand, “bridging” social capital helps facilitate connections across different
101. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS
MODERN ITALY 171 (1993) [hereinafter PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY
WORK]. Of course, social capital can have its “dark side” so to speak. Mafia networks can be seen as networks of trust built on bonding social capital, at least
among the members of the network, but it is put to the service of anti-social and
often violent ends. See, e.g., Jan W. van Deth & Sonja Zmerli, Introduction: Civicness, Equality, and Democracy—A “Dark Side” of Social Capital?, 53 AMERICAN
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 631, 631–35 (2010) (summarizing findings in special issue of
journal on so-called dark side of social capital). As we have seen, a group built on
bonding social capital alone can function in an insular manner towards individuals
not in the group and will offer its members fewer opportunities to “get ahead,”
even while offering mutual support. Social capital is thus a complex subject of
study. While it may be less in vogue than it was when Putnam’s Bowling Alone
was first published, I use it here as a helpful organizing principle to understand the
workings of trust in networks, trust that can lead to civic engagement in the service
of addressing collective action problems.
102. Social capital theory itself is not without its critics. See, e.g., Kenneth J.
Arrow, Observations on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTI-FACETED
PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds., 2000) (raising critiques about social capital); Robert M. Solow, Notes on Social Capital and Economic Performance, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTI-FACETED PERSPECTIVE, supra
at 6 (criticizing the modern concept of social capital).
103. Putnam, America’s Declining Social Capital, supra note 98, at 67. The
trust and collaboration that social capital tends to foster not only helps individuals
socially and economically and ends up creating safer communities, but it also facilitates the functioning of government. Putnam researched civic life in Italy and its
relation to the effectiveness of local government in Italy and found that communities with a rich history of civic life and engagement, manifest in community-based
organizations and other, similar entities and networks, had stronger reserves of
social capital. Furthermore, governments in those regions were much more effective, were less corrupt, and were more responsive to community needs than those
with lower levels of social capital and civic engagement. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 101, at 119–51. See also Stephen Knack, Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States, 46 AMERICAN J. POL.
SCI. 772, 782–84 (2002).
IN
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groups.104 Xavier de Souza Briggs has described bonding social
capital as “social support,” which “helps one ‘get by’ or cope.”105
Bonding “might include being able to get a ride, confide in someone, or obtain a small cash loan in an emergency.”106 Bridging social capital, for de Souza Briggs, is “social leverage,” which “helps
one ‘get ahead’ or change one’s opportunity set through access to
job information, say, or a recommendation for a scholarship or
loan.”107 Bridging social capital proves helpful in assisting individuals to spread their capacities and increase their opportunities beyond their close friends.108 For Putnam, bonding social capital is
“inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and
homogeneous groups,”109 while bridging social capital is “outward
looking and encompass[es] people across diverse social
cleavages.”110
Before the concept of social capital was popularized, the notion that bridging social capital is better than bonding social capital
for improving one’s economic well-being was broached in a seminal
1973 paper by Stanford’s Mark Granovetter. In it, he stressed the
fact that individuals can improve their job prospects through what
he called the “strength of weak ties”: looser connections across social networks are a better means of economic advancement than
one’s immediate circle of contacts.111
This last idea—that it is one’s extended network of contacts
rather than one’s closest friends that tends to yield the greater benefits from one’s store of social capital—presents a critical phenomenon about the importance of social capital, and which sets the stage
for the discussion that follows throughout the rest of this Article.
104. Christiaan Grootaert & Thierry van Bastelaer, Measuring Social Capital:
An Integrated Questionnaire 4 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 18, 2004), https://
openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15033/281100PAPER0Measuring0social0capital.pdf?sequence=1. For more information on forms
of social capital, see ROSS GITTELL & AVIS VIDAL, COMMUNITY ORGANIZING:
BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 9–10 (1998). See also
Brandon Brooks et al., Assessing Structural Correlates to Social Capital in
Facebook Ego Networks, 38 SOC. NETWORKS 1, 10–12 (2014) (finding activation of
diverse ties across a digital network can increase social capital generally).
105. Xavier de Souza Briggs, Brown Kids in White Suburbs: Housing Mobility
and the Many Faces of Social Capital, 9 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 177, 178 (1998).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING
POVERTY 117–31 (2001), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/
11856.
109. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 12, at 22.
110. Id.
111. Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AMERICAN J. SOC.
1360, 1377–78 (1973).
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Central to the notion of social capital is that it is an asset that exists
not in individuals themselves, but in the networks in which they operate, collaborate, maneuver, and function. Indeed, most social
capital theorists include the notion of networks within their definition of the term social capital. For example, Pierre Bourdieu defined social capital as follows: “Social capital is the aggregate of the
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of
mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group.”112
For Putnam, it is hard to untangle social capital’s functioning
from the networks within which it operates. As he explains:
When economic and political negotiation is embedded in dense
networks of social interaction, incentives for opportunism are reduced. At the same time, networks of civic engagement embody
past success at collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration. Finally, dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants’ sense of self, developing
the “I” into the “we,” or enhancing the participants’ “taste” for
collective benefits.113

Similarly, Coleman does not separate social capital from the
networks within which it is manifest. As he explains, “[u]nlike
other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between persons and among persons.”114 While there are different types of social capital, Coleman posits that they have “two
elements in common.” First, “they all consist of some aspect of social structures,” (i.e., networks), and second, “they facilitate certain
actions of actors—whether persons or corporate actors—within the
112. Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND
RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 21 (John G. Richardson ed.,
1986) (footnote omitted).
113. Putnam, America’s Declining Social Capital, supra note 98, at 67.
114. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 302 (1990). See
also Janine Nahapiet & Sumantra Ghoshal, Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and
the Organizational Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 242, 243 (1998) (finding social capital is “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within,
available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an
individual”). This idea is consistent with network theory generally, discussed below, and social network theory in particular. As Christakis and Fowler explain, a
social network is a “specific set of connections between people in [a] group. These
ties, and the particular pattern of these ties, are often more important than the
individual people themselves.” NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER,
CONNECTED: HOW YOUR FRIENDS’ FRIENDS’ FRIENDS AFFECT EVERYTHING YOU
FEEL, THINK, AND DO 9 (2009) [hereinafter CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, CONNECTED].
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structure.”115 Thus, as with Putnam’s view on social capital and
networks, the two are inseparable. Indeed, for Putnam, it is the
“networks of civic engagement” that “foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust.”116
Similarly, Ostrom and Ahn proclaim “social capital itself is more or
less irrelevant beyond the confines of a network.”117
Most recently, Putnam has generated what he calls a “lean and
mean” definition of social capital, which he describes as “social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness.”118 If I may hone the definition even more: social capital is
networked trust.119
Connecting the dots between social capital and collective action problems, Putnam posits further that it is these networks themselves that “facilitate coordination and communication, amplify
reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved.”120 Put another way, social capital creates the conditions
necessary for trust and cooperation: it fosters repeat interactions
115. James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94
AM. J. SOC. S95, S98 (1988).
116. Putnam, America’s Declining Social Capital, supra note 98, at 66.
117. Ostrom & Ahn, supra note 63, at 14. See also Sonja Grabner-Kräute,
Web 2.0 Social Networks: The Role of Trust, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 505, 510 (2009)
(“[T]he concept of social capital can be considered as a way to describe the value
that can be accrued through a social network and from the social resources of the
actors embedded within that network. In other words, the value of social networks
manifests to participants as social capital.”) (citations omitted).
118. Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the
Twenty-First Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137 (2007). See also Brehm
& Rahm, supra note 26, at 1000 (describing social capital “as the reciprocal relationship between civic participation and interpersonal trust”). For a definition of
the term “social network,” see Judith Donath & Danah Boyd, Public Displays of
Connection, 22 BT TECH. J. 71 (2004) (describing social networks as “sources of
emotional and financial support, and of information about jobs, other people, and
the world at large”).
119. Russell Hardin’s review of social capital theory endorses this idea of
networked trust. As he writes:
What then is the nature of the relationship between social capital and
trust? Coleman, Putnam, and others say trust is social capital, or an element of social capital. It appears, however, that the core of the meaning
of social capital in the work of these scholars is not trust but rather the
social relationships, or the networks of such relationships . . . that enable
us to undertake cooperative endeavors. These relationships, of course,
ground trust among the participants in them. They do so because we
have incentive to be trustworthy to those in our networks, therefore making it beneficial to us to trust one another in various undertakings.
RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 83–84 (2002).
120. Putnam, America’s Declining Social Capital, supra note 98, at 67. See
also Fukuyama, Social Capital, supra note 58, at 3 (2000) (describing social capital
as “an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more
individuals”).
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and communications, lowers social distance, and offers a means of
punishment for defection. Indeed, social capital’s ability to foster
cooperation not just between two individuals, but within a network,
is perhaps its greatest strength, and leads to the idea that social capital can serve as a means of generating trust and, in turn, collective
action.121
While I utilize social capital theory as a way to consider how
trust and social networks can lead communities to address collective action problems, social capital theory itself is not without its
critics. Some find the concept difficult to measure122 and others too
amorphous.123 Some argue that what social capital is really measuring is the presence of trust rather than associational activity.124
Nevertheless, the notion that trust, embedded in networks, helps
those networks solve collective action problems is hard to dispute,
whether we call that trust social capital, networked trust, or something else.
Putting aside whether we should embrace the concept of social
capital itself, the notion that individuals and groups can coordinate
to resolve collective action problems is deeply engrained in American culture. Alexis de Tocqueville, during his visits to the United
States in the early 19th century, remarked upon the frequency with
which individuals came together to address problems within their
communities:
121. See, e.g., John T. Scholz et al., Do Networks Solve Collective Action
Problems? Credibility, Search, and Collaboration, 70 J. POL. 393, 401–02 (2008)
(assessing success of estuary management initiatives and finding the ability to
share information about activities across a diverse network more important to coordinating cooperative action than being able to rely on closely-knit, heterogeneous, and smaller groups); Ostrom & Ahn, supra note 63, at 22. Ostrom and Ahn
state:
The various forms of social capital contribute to successful collective action, almost always, by enhancing trust among the actors. In other words,
trust is the core link between social capital and collective action. Trust is
enhanced when individuals are trustworthy, are networked with one another and are within institutions that reward honest behavior.
Id.
122. On the challenges of measuring social capital, see Martin Paldam, Social
Capital: One or Many? Definition and Measurement, 14 J. ECON. SURV. 629,
631–34 (2000).
123. For a critique of the concept of social capital generally and Putnam’s
Bowling Alone in particular, see generally Carl Boggs, Social Capital and Political
Fantasy: Robert Putnam’s “Bowling Alone,” 30 THEORY & SOC. 281 (2001).
124. See Michael P. Claibourn & Paul S. Martin, Trusting and Joining? An
Empirical Test of the Reciprocal Nature of Social Capital, 22 POL. BEHAV. 267,
279–82 (2000) (finding little correlation between associational activity and trust).
See also PIPPA NORRIS, DEMOCRATIC PHOENIX: REINVENTING POLITICAL ACTIVISM 153–156 (2002) (conducting cross-country analysis and finding link between
economic growth and trust rather than associational activity).
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An obstacle comes up on the public highway, passage is interrupted, traffic stops; neighbors immediately establish themselves
in a deliberating body; from this improvised assembly will issue
an executive power that will remedy the ill—before the idea of
an authority preexisting that of those interested has presented
itself to anyone’s imagination.125

For Tocqueville, the Americans he observed practiced the “infinite art”126 of joining together to form civic groups to address
community issues. Regardless of background, Tocqueville would
write that “Americans of all ages, all conditions, all minds constantly unite.”127 These groups were not just “commercial and industrial associations”128 but also “a thousand other kinds: religious,
moral, grave, futile, very general and very particular, immense and
very small.”129 He would observe that “Americans use associations
to give fetes, to found seminaries, to build inns, to raise churches, to
distribute books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this manner they create hospitals, prisons, schools.”130 Comparing American practices to those in Europe, he found that “[e]verywhere that,
at the head of a new undertaking, you see the government in France
and a great lord in England, count on it that you will perceive an
association in the United States.”131
Fast forward over 100 years and historian Arthur Schlesinger
dubbed the United States “a nation of joiners.”132 Indeed, the arc
of American history is full of epochs like the early 19th century in
which civic organizations flourished, and in such civic organizations,
social capital could flower, as both a product and a means of such
civic engagement.133
Putnam’s most significant contribution to social capital theory
may be his claim that social capital in the United States has been
declining over the last 40 years. Using a range of metrics to both
measure the presence of social capital, and to determine its presence and decline in recent years, Putnam posits that social capital,
as measured by the level of generalized trust in a community, the
125. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180–81 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop trans., 2000) (1840).
126. Id. at 489.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 AMERICAN
HIST. REV. 1 (1944).
133. For a history of civic engagement in America, see generally SKOCPOL,
supra note 11.
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strength of civic engagement as reflected in voter turnout and other
metrics, membership in civic organizations, and even the presence
of bowling leagues, is on the decline in the United States.134 If we
are to place faith in the benefits of social capital, this decline has
significant consequences for the ability of communities to work together to solve collective action problems.
At the same time that Putnam posits that social capital is on
the decline, new forms of networks have arisen, made possible by
new technologies. If the essence of social capital is that it exists in
networks, that it is, indeed, networked trust, might these new networks hold out the promise that social capital can thrive within
them, and individuals and communities can harness their strength
to solve collective action problems? It is to these questions that I
turn in the next Part.
II. NETWORKS, COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS,
CAPITAL.

AND

SOCIAL

I began this Article with a comment about the norm-generating community called a nomos. Such nomoi and the networks in
which they are instantiated are all around us. We work in institutions. We are members of community organizations. We are in
constant contact with the internet and social media. We make peerto-peer transactions through networks and engage in commerce
through the sharing economy, a collection of networks activated to
put otherwise latent assets to use for productive purposes. We navigate through traffic, and navigate around police checkpoints,
through networks. The cars we drive and the appliances we use will
soon be in contact with each other through the so-called “Internet
of Things.”135 To understand the relationship between a network
and the nomos it may create and inhabit, it is essential to understand, also, how networks themselves function. This next Part explores the science of networks and the value of social networks in
generating social capital and strengthening the ability of such social
networks to solve collective action problems. It begins with an
overview of the science of networks and follows with a discussion of
the role of social networks in building social capital and dealing
with collective action problems.
134. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 12, at 415–26. Measuring social
capital is not without its challenges, and some take issue with Putnam’s approach.
See, e.g., NORRIS, supra note 124, at 156 (2002).
135. Nicole Kobie, What Is the Internet of Things?, GUARDIAN (May 6, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/06/what-is-the-internet-ofthings-google.
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A. Understanding Networks and the Network Effect.
A network is a set of relations between objects, often considered nodes.136 Networks arise in many ways, in many settings, in
the physical world and cyberspace. Just as a network is defined as
the relationship between objects, any discussion of the characteristics of a particular network centers on the objects in the network
and the relationship between them. First, let us look at the objects
within a network, or its nodes.
The most important characteristic of a network is, perhaps, the
number of nodes within the network. The simplest network is binary, it contains just two nodes and a relationship exists between
the two nodes.137 Such a network is called a dyad. A second kind
of network, as defined by the number of nodes in the network, is a
triad: it consists of three nodes.138 These basic networks are the
building blocks of all networks and, to the extent the number of
nodes within a network exceed two or three, all network relationships consist of dyads and triads embedded into larger networks.139
In a moment, I will discuss the different potential relationships between the nodes, but, for now, the number of nodes can be seen as
the primary characteristic of a network. These different network
building blocks can be depicted schematically and graphically, in
what it typically called a sociogram.140
A second key characteristic of a network is the distance between the nodes. Historically, and before the availability of mass
communications media, networks were often created based on the
proximity of individuals to one another. The closer in proximity
one individual was to another, the greater the chances that the two
individuals would form a relationship and create a network. This is
136. CHARLES KADUSHIN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL NETWORKS: THEORIES,
CONCEPTS, AND FINDINGS 14 (2012).
137. Id. at 14–21.
138. Id. at 22–25.
139. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 371 (2007)
[hereinafter Christakis & Fowler, Obesity] (offering “glossary” of terms from network science).
140. For an early effort at depicting sociograms graphically, what has not become commonplace in the literature, see, for example, J.L. MORENO, WHO SHALL
SURVIVE? FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOMETRY, GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SOCIODRAMA 134–39 (mapping relationships of students enrolled at a high school). See
also Duncan J. Watts, The “New” Science of Networks, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 243,
244–45 (2004) (offering schematic, graphical depictions of different network structures). For sociograms depicting different ways to organize a network of 100
nodes, see CHRISTAKIS & FOWLER, CONNECTED, supra note 114, at 12.
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known in network theory as the concept of propinquity.141 Traditionally, physical or geographical propinquity has been more likely
to lead to the formation of relationships and the development of
networks.142
Another characteristic of the nodes, in relation to each other,
and which influences their likelihood of forming into a network, is
their similarity to one another, what is referred to as homophily.143
In many ways, the lower the social distance between individuals, the
greater the likelihood that there will be homophily—the more alike
they are. Similarity, at least perceived similarity, breeds the formation of networks.144
Homophily can be further divided into two types: status and
value homophily, both of which have consequences for the formation, strength, and effectiveness of social networks (and bear some
relation to the idea that there are two types of social capital: bonding and bridging). Status homophily relates to perceived or recognized characteristics such as race, gender, and age.145 Value
homophily refers to, as its name implies, the values and beliefs individuals hold.146
A final characteristic of networks that I will discuss here, and
which is critical for the discussion that follows about the role of
networks in addressing collective action problems, is the relationship between the nodes. Primarily, the relationship can be either
symmetrical or asymmetrical, which often is a function of perceived
authority of one node over or in relation to another node or nodes
in a network.147 A parent typically would be perceived as having
greater authority over his or her children, at least as long as that
parent is not ill or infirm and relying on the children for support.
Relationships between nodes can be characterized as having a disparity or asymmetry in power or authority. A typical military or
141. KADUSHIN, supra note 136, at 18.
142. See, e.g., John R. Hipp & Andrew J. Perrin, The Simultaneous Effect of
Social Distance and Physical Distance on the Formation of Neighborhood Ties, 8
CITY & COMMUNITY 5 (2009) (highlighting the greater likelihood that individuals
will develop both strong and weak ties based on greater physical proximity).
143. KADUSHIN, supra note 136, at 18–21.
144. Lois M. Verbrugge, The Structure of Adult Friendship Choices, 56 SOC.
FORCES 576, 591–94 (1977) (noting tendency of friendship networks to form based
on similarities in personal characteristics); Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin &
James M. Cook, Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks, 27 ANN. REV.
SOC. 415, 418–29 (2001) (describing functioning of homophily in social networks).
145. KADUSHIN, supra note 136, at 19.
146. See, e.g., Paul F. Lazarsfeld & Robert K. Merton, Friendship as a Social
Process: A Substantive and Methodological Analysis, in FREEDOM AND CONTROL
IN MODERN SOCIETY 18, 23–24 (Morroe Berger et al. eds., 1954).
147. KADUSHIN, supra note 136, at 38–42.
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government network can be seen as containing characteristics of
vertical authority constructed in a way such that authority flows
“down” the chain of command. The typical “organizational chart”
for an institution can be characterized as this type of vertical
network.148
But a network does not necessarily have to be vertical, with
asymmetry of authority among the nodes within the network. A
network can also be seen as “horizontal,” with equal authority
among the members. The relationships between members are thus
symmetrical, and the potential power or authority of one member is
theoretically no greater than the power or authority of another
member. But here’s where the concepts of propinquity and
homophily also come into play. In a horizontal network, where
there is no formal discrepancy in authority among the members (in
what is sometimes called a “flat” organization), one’s proximity and
similarity to another individual within the network will have some
impact on the influence one has over another. Thus, the strength of
the ties, often based on geographic proximity and greater
homophily, will have some effect on the influence one member of
the network has on another.149 Thus, we see the operation of the
strength of the relationships between individuals may be a function
of the distance (geographic and social) of the bond between individual members of a network. The greater the distance, or the length
of the relational tie between nodes, the lower the influence. In
many ways, even large, multi-nodal networks are assessed for their
strength in terms of the strength of the dyads and triads that exist
within those more complex networks.150
At the same time, the aggregate number of nodes can have an
impact on the strength of the network itself. The larger the network in terms of the number of nodes, the greater we see what are
called “network effects.” Network effects are the benefits that flow
from what has come to be known as “Metcalfe’s Law,” named after
computer scientist Robert Metcalfe. Metcalfe posited that the
strength of a network is not merely cumulative—that is, each new
member of a network does not simply increase the aggregate
strength of the network as a proportion of the individual to the
148. For a discussion of vertical and horizontal networks in public settings, see
B. Guy Peters, Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Coordination, 76
PUB. ADMIN. 295 (1998). For examples of organizational charts in different types
of organizations, see KADUSHIN, supra note 136, at 96–97.
149. ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, NETWORK SCIENCE 56–61 (2016).
150. On the relationship of different nodes to each other, see KADUSHIN,
supra note 136, at 29–43.
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whole.151 The tenth member of a network does not merely increase
the power of the network by ten percent. No, Metcalfe posited that
networks grow exponentially, because the power of the network is
in the relationships that form between the members. In other
words, each added node in a network does not merely increase the
power of the network by one but has the potential to multiply that
power by the total number of users.152
When the fax machine was first introduced, one fax machine
was worthless because there were no other fax machines to which
one could transmit a document. Adding a second fax machine
meant that two fax machines could send each other a fax. By the
time there were ten fax machines, each fax machine could send out
faxes to nine other fax machines. This created 90 potential fax connections (ten fax machines each with the capacity to send out faxes
to nine potential fax partners). Thus, a network grows incrementally by adding new members but the increase in benefits that
accrue to that network are exponential.153
A last characteristic of networks relates to the position of a
particular node, which, in many ways, can be a product of
homophily, propinquity, and the nature of the relationship of one
node to another. A node can be at or near a center of a network or
it can be on the periphery, with the density of connections serving
as a reflection of the center or “edges” of a network.154 A node can
have many connections within a particular network or few. It can
also serve as a link between networks. Individual nodes can exist
within multiple networks and the ties that a single node can have to
those multiple networks can serve as a bridge connecting multiple
networks into a single network. The individual nodes thus serve to
fill what are considered structural holes within networks (where
there may be no other or few connected nodes),155 or serve to span
networks, creating larger networks by virtue of the ties that a single
node possesses, assuming that node utilizes its network-spanning
position to tie the networks together. As with the network effects
described above, tying two networks together can increase the
151. On Metcalfe’s law, see BARABÁSI, supra note 149, at 55.
152. George Gilder, Metcalfe’s Law and Legacy, FORBES, Sept. 13, 1993, at
158.
153. This law can be depicted in a mathematical formula as follows, with “n”
as the number of nodes: n x (n-1) = n2 – n. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN,
INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 184
(1999).
154. KADUSHIN, supra note 136, at 26–30.
155. Id. at 29–30.
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strength, reach, durability, and power of networks in dramatic
ways.156
Understanding networks in these ways helps to put into context some of the discussion that preceded. That is, nodes that are
closer to each other in terms of their characteristics and geography
enjoy stronger bonds than those that are less similar and less closely
related geographically. At the same time, networks as a whole are
stronger when they are larger and build on the strength of closer
dyads and triads embedded within them and the relationship of
closely related nodes within the network. Those close relationships
bridge greater distances when individual nodes fill structural holes
that link nodes to extend the number of nodes connected to a network, and even link other networks together to form larger, connected networks in terms of the number of nodes in order to benefit
from network effects.
This description of networks aligns well with the preceding discussion of social capital and its two forms: bonding and bridging
social capital functions the same way that networks operate because, as described above, social capital is always embedded in networks. Those networks can manifest themselves as either the
bonding or bridging variety, or, and this is what is present when
networks grow, they can also exhibit characteristics of both varieties. When connected networks are linked by nodes that draw different social circles together to make, for all intents and purposes, a
single, functioning network, this can serve as an example of bonding
and bridging social capital appearing together in the same
network.157
Furthermore, to pick up on another previous thread of the discussion, it is these “hybrid” networks (those that exhibit both bonding and bridging social capital), that most resemble what Olson
called “federated organizations” and Ostrom described as “nested
enterprises.” It is in such organizations, for these two theorists, that
156. This notion of brokers filling structural holes to create larger networks is
sometimes referred to as “clustering” in network theory. See KADUSHIN, supra
note 136, at 122–30.
157. We see the functioning of these interlinked networks in business relations where clusters of networks within an industry, like appears in Silicon Valley,
create a super-network that increases the strength of the overall effects the network can generate. For a discussion of networks of networks in business settings,
see JOHN SEELY BROWN & PAUL DUGUID, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF INFORMATION
149–51 (2017) (ebook). On the functioning of trust in industrial clusters, see
Charles F. Sabel, Constitutional Ordering in Historical Context, in GAMES IN HIERARCHIES AND NETWORKS: ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE
STUDY OF GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS 94 (Fritz W. Scharpf ed., 1993) [hereinafter
Sabel, Constitutional Ordering].
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coordinated, cooperative action is most likely to arise and in which
the problem of the free rider can be avoided. And it is for such
reasons that networks with these types of relationships can be activated to address collective action problems. Indeed, networks can
function in many ways to deliver value and benefits, to perform
functions, to carry out orders, and to work collaboratively.158
In this section, I have tried to explain the components and
characteristics of networks to create a vocabulary for the conversation that follows, because it is these components and characteristics
that determine the presence, effectiveness, and strength of networks. While networks are activated for many reasons, for my purposes here, I will address the role that networks can play in
addressing, and, hopefully, solving collective action problems. And
it is this issue to which I now turn.
B. Networks, Social Capital, and Collective Action Problems.
As we have seen in previous discussions, collective action dilemmas are solved by cooperation. In turn, Game Theory tells us
that the building block of cooperation is trust. And, to go even
further, as social capital theory suggests, trust that helps people get
by and get ahead is embedded in networks, networks that are a
reflection of our commitments, affinities, preferences, and interests.
These are all embedded in the network’s norms and narratives, rituals and rites. This notion is akin to James Carey’s view on communication as ritual, through which such communication “is directed
not toward the extension of messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of imparting information but
the representation of shared beliefs.”159 These shared beliefs are
communicated in contexts and through vehicles and media that
spread ideas and symbols, norms and narratives, and create a mu158. Economics and law have long recognized the value of network effects.
Adam Smith extolled the benefits and importance of roads, canals, and navigable
waterways for the functioning of economies to ensure competition, connect communities, and assist in economic exchange. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS
156–57 (Charles J. Bullock ed., 2007). Carol Rose has identified the role of common property in building social capital and generating “scale return”: i.e., network
effects. ROSE, supra note 7, at 140–43. She referred to this phenomenon as the
“comedy of the commons:” “the commons were an integral part of a mixed economic pattern where (due to limited markets) labor-intensive individual cultivation and scale-economy common livestock management were necessarily practiced
together.” Id. at 141–42.
159. JAMES W. CAREY, COMMUNICATION AS CULTURE: ESSAYS ON MEDIA
AND SOCIETY 18 (rev. ed. 2009).
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tual understanding of what it means to occupy that network, that
community, that nomos, that world.160
Whether it is in the agora of a town in ancient Greece, a village
green where Tocquevillian associations would come together, or a
virtual meeting space, for millennia, humans have come together in
networks that can be activated to address collective action
problems by the communication of narratives of cooperation. And
at the center of these networks is the concept of trust, trust that is
both a cause and product of social capital. I will first address the
role that trust plays in addressing collective action problems and
then explore how that trust functions within dense social capital
networks. I will then turn to the role of norms and law in promoting or reducing trust, social capital, and cooperation.
Just as Arrow asserts that all commercial transactions have
within them an element of trust, trust is also essential to all forms of
cooperative action if it is to be sustained. Sustained cooperation is
necessary in order to solve collective action problems; otherwise
they would not be collective action problems at all. As we have
seen in the iterated PD games, in order to sustain cooperation, one
needs a combination of trust (to, at a minimum, begin a virtuous
cycle initiated by the trusting first move), trustworthiness, and reciprocity.161 And, we have seen in previous discussions, certain conditions can lead to trust, trustworthiness, and reciprocity. Critical
to our purposes here is the fact that these conditions are manifest in
settings in which social capital arises and is nurtured.
For Putnam, social capital exists in civic organizations that
make up the backbone of civil society, like block associations, book
clubs, bowling leagues, and business groups.162 Our participation in
these civic associations is a product of our trust in the members of
that group that they will not abuse our good will to take advantage
of us in some way. The coordinated actions of these groups lead
individuals to engage in repeat activities and to communicate with
160. As Margaret Somers argues, “[s]ocial identities are constituted through
narrativity, social action is guided by narrativity, and social processes and interaction—both institutional and interpersonal—are narratively mediated.” Margaret
R. Somers, Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action: Rethinking English
Working-Class Formation, 16 SOC. SCI. HIST. 591, 606 (1992) (footnote omitted).
161. Using survey data from the General Social Survey’s questions that measure both trust and civic engagement, Brehm & Rahm found a “tight reciprocal
relationship between civic engagement and interpersonal trust.” Brehm & Rahm,
supra note 26, at 1017. The authors posited that generalized trust helps facilitate
cooperation at the outset, which then is strengthened through the experience of
cooperative civic engagement which “reinforce[s] norms of reciprocity as a byproduct of self-interested cooperation.” Id. at 1008 (citations omitted).
162. See, e.g., PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 101, at 119.
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one another. Given the conscious and unconscious workings of
homophily, it is likely that one’s participation in a group is already a
product of lower social distance than that which separates participants from individuals who are not otherwise members of the
group, but, the engagement with the group itself will lower
whatever intragroup social distance that otherwise exists. It will
then spur more cooperation. Tocqueville described this phenomenon as follows: “One is occupied with the general interest at first
by necessity and then by choice; what was calculation becomes instinct; and by dint of working for the good of one’s fellow citizens,
one finally picks up the habit and taste of serving them.”163 Thus,
civic engagement is both a product of trust but also creates the conditions in which trust can increase and generate more cooperation.
In other words, opportunities for repeat interactions and communications arise in such settings, such interactions can lower social distance, and the relationships are ones where defection can serve as a
credible form of punishment to spur ongoing, cooperative conduct.
Depending on the nature of the group and its goals, the trust these
conditions create can lead the group to work together to solve collective action problems, like monitoring a neighborhood for crime
or graffiti, inducing members of the community to participate in a
park cleanup day, reducing drunk driving, or encouraging greater
recycling.164
These civic organizations, in which these conditions can arise,
are themselves networks in the sense we have described them so far
here. The civic organizations are made up of nodes (members) and
the relationships between the nodes can be activated to carry out
functions, share information, send communications that coordinate
actions and inform members of the group about the trustworthiness
of others, and even send messages about the potential for punishment if members engage in non-cooperative behavior. In many
ways, such networks are a means of reducing the transaction costs
associated with carrying out collective action problems. That is,
these networks do several things: they provide a pool of network
members from which one can identify potential partners for collective endeavors; they spread information about such partners (their
reputation for trustworthiness, etc.); they facilitate negotiation with
163. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 125, at 488.
164. A range of interest, goals, and forces can motivate and activate individuals to act cooperatively with other members of a network. See, e.g., Martijn van
Zomeren et al., Toward an Integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action:
A Quantitative Research Synthesis of Three Socio-Psychological Perspectives, 134
PSYCHOL. BULL. 504, 523–25 (2008) (describing impact of self-identity, perceptions
of injustice, and efficacy on increasing motivation for collective action).
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them to work collectively; and they serve as a means of enforcing
commitments through the punishments the network can mete out
for non-compliance (like shunning, gossip, removal from the group,
or withdrawal of the benefits of the group, to name just a few).
In many ways, the network becomes a vehicle for transmitting
norms of behavior through the telling of stories, including the norm
to trust and behave in a trustworthy fashion. While we may exist in
a larger culture or even world, our peer groups are what help define
us and communicate norms to us about how we should act. As Tina
Rosenberg explains: “[w]hat society expects of its members is informally enforced by a very large group, but people typically measure themselves and set their own rules by looking at the social
norms of a handful of peers.”165 In turn, these judgments “rule our
lives.”166
Research shows that our networks have great power in communicating the norms of a group, leading to behavior that is consistent with that norm.167 In some ways, the norms help attract
individuals who are willing to behave in conformity with them, and,
in others, those norms can also lead individuals to shape their behavior to bring it in line with the norms. Research on social networks reveals just this point: networks can communicate norms,
those norms can shape the behavior of the individuals within a network, and they have particular force when the promotion of cooperation is the goal.168 Over time, networks can send messages
about acceptable behavior and desired norms that lead to actions
that are consistent with those norms throughout the network. As
one study showed of the impact of obesity within a network, the
presence of obese members in a network can influence those with
close ties to those individuals to, themselves, become obese. Norms
that might communicate a message that obesity is commonplace

165. TINA ROSENBERG, JOIN THE CLUB: HOW PEER PRESSURE CAN TRANSWORLD 33 (2011).
166. Id.
167. Roger V. Gould, Collective Action and Network Structure, 58 AMERICAN
SOC. REV. 182, 194–95 (1993) (describing the role of networks of individuals in
collective action settings in serving to distribute information about efficacy, fairness, and shirking and the impact of such information on participation in collective
efforts of the network).
168. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 60, at 2076 (“[I]nformal norms will have to
bear much of the burden of ensuring productive cooperation rather than collectively self-destructive exploitation. In particular, norms of reciprocity help provide
the baseline framework that structures, organizes, and facilitates cooperation and
thereby enables trust to arise and be sustained.”).
FORM THE
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can lead those receiving the message and within the network to also
become obese.169
Again and again, Putnam’s research on social capital stresses
the role of both norms and networks as part of the manifestations
of social capital but also in how social capital operates. Furthermore, our understanding of network theory helps identify the ways
in which social networks and social capital can be activated to communicate norms of reciprocity, trust, and cooperation, and, in turn,
to help solve collective action problems.170 The same concepts that
arise in network theory help explain the functioning of social capital
and the network effects that arise from the activation of social networks help to illuminate the broad capacity of networks that are
built on both bonding and bridging social capital to solve collective
action problems.171 Indeed, close relationships help foster trust and
facilitate credible commitments toward cooperative action; in turn,
bridging social capital helps activate larger-scale networks to produce cooperation and generate broad-based solutions to collective
action problems.
One of the network effects the activity of the connected group
generates is the capacity for future cooperative and collaborative
action. New relationships are formed, and an appetite for collective
action, made stronger by the experience of success achieved
through such action, arises. By participating in the collective action
of a cross-group network, the members of one group connect with
members of another group to which they do not otherwise belong,
creating new relationships and forming new bonds, raising the capital of each of the members (the objects or nodes, to use the theoretical terms) of the network itself. Once this new network
169. Christakis & Fowler, Obesity, supra note 139, at 377 (showing increased
risk for obesity based on prevalence of obesity in one’s network, particularly one’s
closer ties in relation to social distance rather than physical distance).
170. Ostrom & Ahn, supra note 63, at 24 (“Dense horizontal networks—referred to as bonding social networks—with the capability of efficiently transmitting
information across the network members also create incentives to behave in a
trustworthy manner even for those who have only selfish motivations.”); Sunstein,
Expressive Function, supra note 60, at 2029 (asserting that “[m]any social norms
solve collective action problems” through coordination and “imposing social sanctions on defectors” which can include ostracism and shame) (citations omitted).
171. Ostrom & Ahn, supra note 63, at 25 (“[N]etworks and institutions enhance trust among individuals in a collective-action situation . . . [by] chang[ing]
the incentive structure of the trustee. As a result, the trustor knows the incentive
structure the trustee faces given the repetitive nature of the interaction, the existence of other network members who observe the trustee’s behavior, and the rules
and laws that punish or reward the trustee. Common understanding between the
trustor and the trustee regarding the existence and functioning of those factors
encourages them both to engage in productive transactions.”).
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superstructure is formed, its ability to generate future collective action is strengthened as its ability to generate norms of reciprocity is
also strengthened. What’s more, such norms of reciprocity will be
more durable, efficient, and effective than other means of generating trust and trustworthy behavior.172
Indeed, the norms that are a product of social-capital-induced
cooperation are stronger and less costly to generate and monitor
than many other means available to attempt to produce cooperative
behavior.173 Voluntarily followed norms are invariably easier, more
efficient, and less costly to police because, in fact, they require no
monitoring.174 Such norms are often more democratic than laws
that are passed through processes that are opaque, subjected to the
forces of capture, and generated through non-transparent mechanisms.175 Such norms often are communicated through stories and
are a product of self-governance.176 They are adopted voluntarily
172. See, e.g., Ostrom & Ahn, supra note 63, at 30 (“Self-governing systems in
any arena of social interaction tend to be more efficient and stable not because of
any magical effects of grassroots participation itself but because of the social capital in the form of effective working rules those systems are more likely to develop
and preserve, the networks that the participants have created and the norms they
have adopted.”).
173. Examples of the costly nature of oversight and regulation overwhelming
regulators’ ability to monitor compliance abound. The proto-revolutionaries in the
1760s learned this lesson early on, as the British government’s ability to enforce
the Stamp Act was limited by an inability to dedicate the resources necessary to do
so. See EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS:
PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION, 281–83 (1995). A military strategy, embraced by Alexander Hamilton, was to sow doubt in the British government’s creditors such
that it would raise the cost of debt to unmanageable levels, which would undermine the Crown’s ability to underwrite the military effort to suppress the colonial
revolt. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris (April 30, 1781), https://
founders.archives.gov/?q=volume%3AHamilton-01-02&s=1511311112&r=
2&sr=morris. For a more modern discussion of the tradeoffs of costs and oversight, enforcement of copyright protections, and the norms that develop around
enforcement, see Christopher Jensen, Note, The More Things Change, the More
They Stay the Same: Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social Norms, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 531, 549–50 (2003).
174. On the cost of monitoring of norms, see, for example, DAVID GAUTHIER,
MORALS BY AGREEMENT 164–66 (1986).
175. That is not to say that formal democratic processes cannot generate or
reflect community norms. Heather Gerken calls the diffusion of democratic decision-making in juries, town councils, and the like “disaggregated democracy.”
Heather Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1108–09
(2005).
176. Such norm and narrative-creating processes are not alien to lawmaking
and legal interpretation. Indeed, it can play a role even in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from
a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 322–26 (2001) (describing
the role of popular mobilization around narratives and norms in constitutional interpretation). For the role of social movements in shaping constitutional law in the
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and as a product of one’s active, participatory, and chosen commitments, lending them greater legitimacy to the individual.177 As
such, individuals place greater trust in them; in turn, they are more
likely to comply with them.178 In these ways, again, we see that
social capital is not just a product of trust, but the fruit of social
capital is often trust itself, a faith in the product of the processes
unleashed by social capital: the norms that social capital networks
have the potential for generating, the stories a community tells.
***
We know that trust, trustworthiness, and social capital play significant roles in promoting collective solutions to collective action
problems. We also know that generalized trust in many countries,
most notably the United States, has been in decline since the early
1970s.179 In addition, as Putnam suggests, social capital, as measured using a few common metrics, has also been in decline during
that same period, perhaps because generalized trust is often used as
one of the determinants of the presence of social capital.180 Putnam
posits that some of the factors that have led to this decline in social
capital include: the increase of two-earner families, meaning there
is less time for individuals to spend on civic activities and participate in civic groups; increase in travel times for employment (again,
meaning less time for civic engagement); an increase in use of “electronic entertainment,” especially the television; and “generational
change,” as individuals in age cohorts that were more inclined toward civic engagement (think the so-called “Greatest Generation”)

fields of marriage equality, gun rights, and human rights, see generally DAVID
COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016) (describing role of community-based advocacy in movements for legal social change).
177. On the role of participation in the legitimacy of norms, see JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS xvi (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press
1975) (1973); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS
TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 107 (William Rehg trans.,
MIT Press 1996) (1992).
178. For a discussion of the value of custom and practice over legislative fiat
for efficient outcomes that enjoy popular support, see Robert D. Cooter, Inventing
Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New Guinea, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
759, 781–95 (1991).
179. See, e.g., PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 12, at 135–41.
180. See NORRIS, supra note 124, at 153–56 (arguing that determinants of social capital are often indications of the presence or absence of trust).
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get older, newer generations have less experience with and connection to civic engagement and cooperation.181
If these theories are to be believed about, first, the decline in
social capital, and, second, the causes of that decline, should they
raise concerns that Americans’ capacity for solving collective action
problems is also diminished? At the same time, however, new
forces in American culture may create their own impacts on the
presence or absence of social capital in American communities.
First, while there does not appear to be a decline in two-earner families, commute times may be decreasing as many Americans are
choosing to move back to cities from the suburbs and a larger percentage of Americans, spurred by technological advancements, are
working from home for at least a portion of the work week.182
Second, the Internet and mobile technologies are both offering
a nearly unlimited array of entertainment possibilities, but are also
offering Americans more opportunities to connect. Indeed, it now
seems quaint that 25 years ago Bruce Springsteen lamented that
there were 57 channels on his television set and yet nothing was
“on.”183 While the television may have been distracting and offered
little opportunity for interaction and engagement, if any, new media
offers a dizzying array of options and can be more interactive and
connective, presenting a means through which individuals can connect to each other and to a greater network.
Twentieth century media theorist Marshall McLuhan described
what he saw as “hot” and “cold” media, with the different classifications deriving from their relative effects on the user of that media.
He used the term “hot media” for those forms of media that generate a passive reaction from the user; in contrast, “cool” or “cold”
media engages the user in active ways, asking that user to fill in or
complete the content.184 New media, and the networks on which
such media operate, offer users the opportunity to engage with
other users. Even sites like YouTube, which would seem to qualify
181. For a summary of Putnam’s arguments with respect to the potential reasons for the reduction in social capital that he identifies, see PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE, supra note 12, at 283–84.
182. Niraj Chokshi, More Are on the Job While Out of the Office, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2017, at B4 (reporting on the rise of telecommuting in American
workforce).
183. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, 57 Channels (And Nothin’ On), on HUMAN
TOUCH (Columbia Records 1992). Springsteen himself, in a post on Facebook,
described the song as “[s]hot back in the quaint days of only 57 channels and no
flat screen TVs.” Bruce Springsteen, FACEBOOK (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.face
book.com/brucespringsteen/posts/10152634806030250.
184. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF
MAN 22–23 (1994).
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as a hot media, offer viewers the chance to rate the content, comment on it, and share it with friends and acquaintances on other
media. Thus, embedded within new forms of media are opportunities for engagement and connection, unlike with the last generation
of entertainment and communications technology, such as radio
and television.185
Third, the generational changes, through which the United
States is moving, present the opportunity for more and more individuals to grow up as so-called “digital natives”: individuals who
have come of age having at their disposal the full range of digital
tools for communicating, connecting, and engaging.186 Some may
see these new tools as offering individuals, particularly those who
have grown up with such tools, the chance to “tune in and drop
out” to borrow a portion of a phrase from 1960s guru Timothy
Leary187: to disconnect and to be distracted from reality, and to
minimize face-to-face interactions. At the same time, they also offer the opportunity for greater connection and the development of
broad but weak ties.
Given what we know about the so-called “strength of weak
ties,” the possibility that new media can facilitate such ties may
have a profound effect on the ability of new media to strengthen,
and not diminish, social capital and, more importantly, the benefits
that flow from it. By expanding our weak ties, given the importance they play in addressing social action dilemmas, new media
networks thus have the potential for increasing the ability of individuals to solve collective action problems.188 Thus, while digital
networks may threaten the creation of strong, bonding social capital
185. For a description of user-generated content on social media, see CLAUWYRWOLL, SOCIAL MEDIA: FUNDAMENTALS, MODELS, AND RANKING OF
USER-GENERATED CONTENT 12–24 (2014). While McLuhan referred to the television as a “cool” medium, Putnam’s view of the television as having an impact on
civic engagement might justify reclassification: that is, that since its effects may be
to pacify the user, it might qualify as a “hot” media under McLuhan’s analysis. On
the changing dynamics of the media with the transition from television to social
media, see CLAY SHIRKY, COGNITIVE SURPLUS: CREATIVITY AND GENEROSITY IN
A CONNECTED AGE 51–56 (2010).
186. See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING
THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 1–7 (2008) (describing digital
natives).
187. The original phrase was “[t]urn on, tune in, and drop out” and was meant
as a response to the current political and social milieu of the 1960s, which included
use of psychedelic drugs and becoming more aware of one’s cultural surroundings
and their deeper meanings. Leary later lamented that the phrase was interpreted
to encourage drug use and engage in unproductive activities. TIMOTHY LEARY,
FLASHBACKS: A PERSONAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF AN ERA 253 (1983).
188. Ostrom & Ahn stress the importance of weak ties in addressing collective action problems as follows:
DIA
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by diminishing opportunities for face-to-face interactions, they can
also play a role in assisting their members to address social dilemmas by offering them opportunities to expand their broader networks and increasing the number of weak ties they have at their
disposal.189
Whether new, virtual networks threaten to reduce or hold out
the promise that they will strengthen trust, trustworthiness, and social capital or diminish our ability to solve collective action
problems is the question I will address next. What follows in Part
III is an analysis of digital networks in light of traditional network
theory as well as a review of existing research on the extent to
which digital networks might foster, or undermine, trust, and trustworthiness: i.e., whether they create what I have called synthetic
social capital. It sets the stage for the final Part in which I explore
whether individuals and communities can deploy this type of social
capital in the service of addressing collective action problems.
III. DIGITAL NETWORKS, SOCIAL CAPITAL,
ACTION PROBLEMS.

AND

COLLECTIVE

A. What Are Digital Networks and How Do They Relate to
Social Network Theory Generally?
Modern technology has transformed commerce, social life, and
civic engagement, mostly by utilizing the power of networks. I
opened the previous Part with the notion that networks are all
around us, and a quick review of existing digital networks, and
those that are slowly emerging, reveals the truth of this statement.
While it is easy to see that the social media platforms described
here are networks, networks arise in many other contexts as well.
The internet is a massive, globe-spanning network, connecting
every one of the billions of nodes on the network with every other
existing node. Sharing economy platforms are also networks, as
By linking the close relationships within a local community to external
actors who have new knowledge, larger stores of financial capital, and
political connections, communities characterized by both bonding and
bridging capital are more effective in solving big problems than those
who have only close networks or loose connections to the outside world.
Ostrom & Ahn, supra note 63, at 24.
189. Fabio Sabatini & Francesco Sarracino, E-participation, Social Capital and
the Internet, 39–40 (FEEM, Working Paper No. 81, 2014), http://www.feem.it/m/
publications_pages/20141031518434NDL2014-081.pdf (analyzing households
surveys to find that use of social networking sites increased face-to-face interactions but also diminished overall trust because users’ networks expanded beyond
traditional, close-knit ties).
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such platforms hold out the promise of matchmaking between producer nodes and consumer nodes with relative ease.
In the very near future, we are likely to see the expansion of
the Internet of Things and autonomous but connected vehicles, like
passenger cars and commercial trucks. These new, digital networks
can be described through the definitional tools of network theory,
though digital networks look somewhat different than traditional,
analog ones. While a review of the functioning of all types of networks made possible by new computing powers is beyond the scope
of this Article, the following discussion will provide an overview of
digital social networks, their relation to traditional network theory,
and the implications they have for social capital theory.
First, we have looked at the idea of homophily in terms of how
it manifests itself in networks generally. Digital social networks are
often built on this notion of homophily. Indeed, whether it is helping one find a group of authors of Harry Potter fan fiction,190 or
followers of the Australian Rules football club the Darwin Buffaloes of the Northern Territory Football League,191 the Internet and
social media help to match individual tastes and interests with those
who share them. This ability of digital networks to facilitate this
type of matching leads individuals to find others like them, but can
also create information silos through which individuals only receive
information from those who are like them.192 We see this matching
prevalent in individuals’ access of news and information, creating a
filter that keeps out conflicting or different viewpoints, limiting our
ability to receive different perspectives, and perhaps modifying or
altering our pre-existing beliefs.193
While homophily is an obvious component of digital networks,
the idea of propinquity—that the geographic proximity of nodes on
a network helps to strengthen the relationship between the nodes—
is not necessarily present in digital social networks. Putting aside
any degradation of digital signals that might occur over great distances (which are quite minimal), theoretically, there is really no
190. One website that gathers such fan fiction lists over 85,000 entries for
Harry Potter-related stories submitted by amateur writers. See HARRY POTTER
FAN FICTION, https://www.harrypotterfanfiction.com/ (last visited June 7, 2017).
191. For the Facebook page of the Darwin Buffaloes, see Darwin Buffaloes
Football Club, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/DarwinBuffs/ (last visited
June 7, 2017).
192. On the present capacity of digital social networks for matching, see
TYLER COWEN, THE COMPLACENT CLASS: THE SELF-DEFEATING QUEST FOR THE
AMERICAN DREAM 13–15 (2017).
193. On the influence of information filters, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA, 59–61 (2017).
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difference in strength in the relationships between nodes on a digital social network. The strength of those relationships will depend
on other factors. Indeed, for the strength of relationships in digital
networks, we need to look at some of those other factors; propinquity bears less relationship to the strength of ties in digital social
networks.194
Another component of network theory is the effect networks
have on transaction costs. Partly because of the fact that propinquity bears little relation to the strength of digital ties, the transaction costs associated with activating digital networks are low.
Particularly as they relate to communicating and coordinating network activities, the effort required to utilize digital networks to try
to facilitate collaborative action is minimal.195 As a result, the ability to grow one’s connections and bridge social networks can be
achieved with little effort, leading to an increase in the number of
overall nodes one can activate and the number of networks one can
leverage to achieve one’s goals. That is, such effort can grow the
size of a network with some degree of ease and thus increase the
network effects that such a network can generate.
As this brief review shows, digital social networks share some
common features with traditional networks and can be assessed using network theory, even though they do not merely replicate all
aspects of traditional, analog networks in precisely the same ways.
To the extent digital social networks share some features with traditional social networks, do they also generate trust, trustworthiness,
and social capital as traditional networks are capable of doing?
And, what does the answer to this question say about the ability of
digital networks to help individuals and networks address collective
194. On the role of propinquity in digital networks, see Martha W. Perry &
Alexandra V. Ricca, Instant Messaging: Virtual Propinquity for Health, 13 PROMOTION & EDUC. 211, 211–12 (2006).
195. For a discussion of the advantages of digital social networks for reducing
the transaction costs associated with communicating, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND
FREEDOM 106–29 (2006). The ability of individuals to communicate inexpensively
has been a critical feature of the development of communications technologies,
from the printing press, postal system, and telegraph to the telephone, radio, and
television, with regulatory policy often affecting the price of communication in
profound ways. For a discussion of the interplay between regulatory oversight,
communications technologies, and the availability of such technologies, see generally PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS (2004). As Benkler points out, the Internet has shifted the
paradigm of control over communications and the costs they entail. As he explains, the internet is “the first modern communications medium that expands its
reach by decentralizing the capital structure of production and distribution of information, culture, and knowledge.” BENKLER, supra, at 30.
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action problems? The next subsection reviews existing literature on
the question of the impact of digital social networks on trust, trustworthiness, and social capital.
B. Do Digital Networks Generate Trust, Trustworthiness, and
Social Capital?
Social science research on the relationship between digital networks, trust, trustworthiness, and social capital is still in its infancy.
With the introduction of the Apple iPhone in 2007, which helped
launch the mobile revolution,196 the availability of longitudinal
studies on the impact of digital networks on social capital is limited.
Advances in technology and the capacity of mobile and internetbased technologies to spur communication, collaboration, and coordination, are occurring so quickly that it is difficult to measure their
impact, a problem that has plagued this type of research since they
became subjects of serious study.197 Nevertheless, research is beginning to bear fruit, with at least tentative findings. The findings
seem to suggest—contrary to early concerns that the technology of
the internet would diminish social capital as television is believed to
have done before it—that new modes of communicating and new,
digital networks, hold out the promise that they can help build social capital and facilitate trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation. In
summary, the research seems to show that digital networks help to
build weak ties, disintermediate engagement,198 communicate
norms, strengthen the ability to coordinate efforts of a network, offer new modes of engagement, amplify network effects, lower transaction costs, and facilitate effective crowdsourcing. I will explore
each of these findings, in turn, below.
1. Facilitating Weak Ties.
One consistent finding in the literature on the impact of digital
networks on social capital is that they help facilitate the conversion
196. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THANK YOU FOR BEING LATE: AN OPTIMIST’S
GUIDE TO THRIVING IN THE AGE OF ACCELERATIONS 19–21 (2016) (describing
introduction of the iPhone and other events that occurred in 2007).
197. Paolo Bounanno et al., Does Social Capital Reduce Crime?, 52 J. L. &
ECON. 145, 150 (2009) (“The most complex and debatable issue is how to measure
social capital, given its multidimensional and multifaceted nature.”).
198. Deborah Halbert, Two Faces of Disintermediation: Corporate Control or
Accidental Anarchy, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 86–89 (2006) (describing
disintermediation).
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of latent weak ties into formal weak ties.199 That is, one may have a
collection of friends and acquaintances he or she has formed over
time—from early school days, prior employment, a social circle in
which one used to participate—but those weak ties are so weak that
they are not leveraged effectively because the individual does not
stay in touch with those friends and acquaintances in any meaningful way. Without a means of communicating with or connecting to
those individuals, one cannot leverage those ties in the pursuit of
selfish or mutual ends. Digital networks help to formalize those
weak ties into actionable relationships by making it easy to connect
with old friends and acquaintances.200 Those connections, greased
by communications over time (think of the regular status update, or
the birthday greeting prompted by social media platforms), help to
strengthen them, meaning that they can be activated and leveraged
later. Moreover, since these connections tend to be more attenuated than one’s closest friends, it opens up the possibility that those
ties can connect individuals to new networks to which one might
not otherwise have access, increasing bridging and bonding relationships at the same time.201
One study of college students’ social media use and its relation
to social capital revealed that the chief benefit derived from such
use seemed to have been the ability to form ties to an extended
network rather than one’s closest friends, meaning that digital net199. See, e.g., Sabatini & Sarracino, supra note 189, at 36 (analyzing household surveys to conclude that social networking sites offered opportunities to activate otherwise latent ties).
200. Barry Wellman, Computer Networks as Social Networks, 293 SCI. 2031,
2032 (2001) (arguing that the internet is not “destroying community,” but, rather
computer networks help foster communication among large groups and bring otherwise unconnected individuals into contact with each other). Nicole B. Ellison et
al., The Benefits of Facebook “Friends:” Social Capital and College Students’ Use of
Online Social Network Sites, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1143, 1153–63
(2007) (finding that Facebook use among groups of college students positively correlated with formation of bridging social capital because it helped to activate otherwise latent ties; Facebook use was also helpful in the formation of bonding social
capital but the correlation was not as strong as with bridging social capital). But cf.
Juliet E. Carlisle & Robert C. Patton, Is Social Media Changing How We Understand Political Engagement: An Analysis of Facebook and the 2008 Presidential
Election, 66 POL. RES. Q. 883 (2013) (assessing political activities of a sample of
Facebook users and finding the number of Facebook “friends” did not determine
the level of political engagement but noting that same did not necessarily hold true
for minorities).
201. Andrea Kavanaugh et al., Weak Ties in Networked Communities, in
COMMUNITIES AND TECHNOLOGIES 265, 283 (Marleen Huysman et al., eds., 2003)
(studying internet usage in Blacksburg, Va., and finding that frequent internet
users who were already rich in bridging social capital used the internet for “maintaining relations and increasing face-to-face interaction, both of which help to
build bonding and bridging types of social capital in communities”).

530

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:479

works helped to facilitate bridging social capital more so than bonding social capital. The latter form of social capital did not
necessarily need help through digital channels to facilitate.202 Similarly, a study of a community in Canada that had recently been fitted for high speed internet access showed that the ability to
communicate with ease among neighbors throughout the community helped the members of that community extend their network
beyond their immediate circle of friends and neighbors, formalizing
otherwise latent weak ties.203 Thus, digital tools seem capable of
facilitating the activation of weak ties, a critical engine of bridging
social capital.
2. Disintermediation.
One of the most important aspects of social media for organizations and organizing is that individuals are themselves in charge
of the medium. Since, in the words of McLuhan, every medium
becomes an extension of ourselves,204 in profound ways, the ability
to communicate with others in a disintermediated205 fashion—without a third-party to send the telegram, project the news story, or
print the pamphlet—places the power of the message to be conveyed in the hands of the one who wants to convey it, as opposed to
some third-party who would shape it or control it outright. As the
medium becomes an extension of ourselves, so, too, the message,
the narrative, and the story we tell become a more accurate reflection of who we are, or, rather, who we wish to communicate we
are.206 Polkinghorne describes the relationship between identity
202. Ellison et al., supra note 200, at 1162–65.
203. Keith Hampton & Barry Wellman, Neighboring in Netville: How the Internet Supports Community and Social Capital in a Wired Suburb, 2 CITY & COMMUNITY 277, 294 (2003) (studying internet usage in a fully wired Toronto, Canada,
suburb and finding internet usage helped to build bridging social capital among
weak ties). As Quan-Haase and Wellman argue:
The fact that people are not interacting in visible public spaces does not
mean that they are in isolation. They may be going online to create new
online worlds, using instant messaging to chat with old and new friends,
visiting online communities, or playing multi-user games. The Internet
makes it necessary to redefine our understanding of what social capital is.
We believe that the Internet will intensify the interpersonal transformation from ‘door-to-door’ to ‘place-to-place’ and individualized ‘person-toperson’ networks.
Anabel Quan-Haase & Barry Wellman, How Does the Internet Affect Social Capital?, in SOCIAL CAPITAL & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 113, 130 (Marleen Huysman & Volker Wulf eds., 2004) (citation omitted).
204. MCLUHAN, supra note 184, at 3–6.
205. See generally Halbert, supra note 198.
206. In these ways, digital storytelling is bottom-up and democratic rather
than top-down and mediated. See Knut Lundby, Introduction to DIGITAL STORY-
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formation and narrative as follows: “[i]dentity consists not simply
of a self-narrative that integrates one’s past events into a coherent
story, however. It also includes the construction of a future story
that continues the ‘I’ of the person.”207
Such identity formation can go beyond the self and incorporate
narratives in broader contexts, however. Since one of Ostrom’s design principles for effective cooperative action includes the ability
to take part in the drafting and amending of rules that govern a
setting,208 the disintermediation available through new, digital, media allows all members of a group and network to participate in the
setting, amending, and conveying of norms and rules, in not just
identity formation, but also community building and norm generation.209 Where third-party institutions traditionally played a role in
creating the conditions in which trust could function, through licensing and accrediting, etc.,210 today, individuals can participate in
norm-generation which, itself, helps to produce trust.
This effort helps to lower social distance between the members
of the group because they are participating in the rulemaking function through dialogue and experimentation, which, itself, builds social capital and whets the appetite for further cooperation.211 It
also strengthens the legitimacy of the rules and norms that the
group decides will govern the collective endeavor, as the norms are
better reflections of the individual’s self-identity because of her participation in their creation.212
TELLING, MEDIATED STORIES: SELF-REPRESENTATION IN NEW MEDIA 4 (Knut
Lundby ed., 2008).
207. DONALD E. POLKINGHORNE, Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences 107 (1988).
208. OSTROM, supra note 34, at 93.
209. The powerful pull of setting the rules that governs one’s actions can be
seen in the rhetoric of the American revolution, in which “no taxation without
representation” became a rallying cry, but, beyond the rhetoric, this desire to establish the rules by which the colonists would be governed was a significant component of revolutionary fervor. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, 24 (1998 ed.).
210. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 941, 965–67 (1963) (describing role of third-party
institutions in fostering trust).
211. Surowiecki has described the value of broad participation, diversity, and
independence in better decision making. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF
CROWDS 29–30 (2005).
212. This sort of participation also builds in legitimacy and accountability,
making processes more consistent with the democratic ideal. Michael C. Dorf &
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267, 288–89 (1998). For a discussion of the value of decentralized decision
making, see SUROWIECKI, supra note 211, at 70–72.
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3. Communicating Norms.
As discussed above, social networks help generate social
norms, and they often do this by communicating through stories,
narratives, and even myths. Digital networks are no different; they
just give network members new tools for communicating their stories and to do so in powerful ways.213 Assessing survey responses
related to traditional and virtual civic engagement, Kittilson and
Dalton found as follows:
[T]he mechanisms through which citizens interact with others are
evolving with the new technology of the Internet (and other new
technologies). Indeed, more people are looking at their computer monitors or smartphone screens, and many use this experience to connect to others in their social groups, others who share
their cultural, social or political interests, and to garner information about the medium.214

While they do not assert that social media platforms can “completely substitute for bowling leagues and choral societies,” they did
conclude that digital networks “have many of the same benefits for
citizen norms and political involvement as traditional civil society.”215 They found that virtual network activity “is most clearly
linked to a participatory style of citizenship,” through “participatory norms of engaged citizenship.”216 Furthermore, they
concluded that such activity is “positively associated with several
forms of political engagement.”217 Research also shows that social
media can be activated to promote cooperative action, through the
norms that the medium can communicate through a network.218
213. For a discussion of the power of storytelling through social media, see
Bryan Alexander & Alan Levine, Web 2.0 Storytelling: Emergence of a New Genre,
43 EDUCAUSE REV. 40 (2008).
214. Miki Caul Kittilson & Russell J. Dalton, Virtual Civil Society: The New
Frontier of Social Capital?, 33 POL. BEHAV. 625, 640–41 (2011).
215. Id. at 641.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Robert M. Bond et al., A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization, 489 NATURE 295, 295–97 (2012) (finding that individuals on Facebook who received information regarding whether their close
friends had voted were more likely to vote themselves). Zeynep Tufekci has also
identified another way in which networks that form as social networks can generate narratives, but narratives that can have an impact beyond the network, narratives that have a persuasive effect, and convince those beyond the network of that
network’s desired policy outcomes. This “narrative capacity,” Tufekci explains, is
“a movement’s capacity to get attention and to appeal on its own terms to the
broad public for redress of its grievances . . . . [It] is a movement’s ability to articulate a voice, get its voice heard, and have it responded to as legitimate.” ZEYNEP
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These norms are often communicated through narratives. Indeed,
it is instructive that four of the main social media sites—Snapchat,
Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram—all use different functions
that they each call “Stories” as a vehicle for communicating symbols, images, and language.219
4. Strengthen Capacities for Coordination of Efforts.
Early research on the role of digital networks in building social
capital indicates that such networks help the members of a network
facilitate and coordinate their cooperative efforts.220 As the findings of the study of the networked community in Canada reveal, the
residents of a housing development took collective action, spurred
by their ability to coordinate over digital networks, to improve the
responsiveness of the housing developer who had constructed the
housing development in which the residents lived.221 This coordination included communication across digital platforms in the pseudonymous “Netville” to encourage individuals to apply pressure on
the developer to improve services to the community. The researchers found as follows:
Netville’s developer reported that the residents organized their
protests with unprecedented and unexpected speed. He was unprepared for the increased volume of communication with residents—largely through their emailing him. Local town officials
were surprised by the success of the demands of wired residents
for improved customer service. They noted that these protests
happened even though the developer had moved a customer service trailer into the neighborhood—a service that no other development had received in recent memory. Residents also achieved
unusual success in preventing the developer from receiving the
town government’s approval to expand Netville even though this
was usually a routine bureaucratic process. Based on their experience in Netville, the developer, and one of the firm’s owners
TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED
PROTESTS 194–95 (2016).
219. Kurt Wagner, Facebook Copied Snapchat a Fourth Time, and Now All Its
Apps Look the Same, RECODE (Mar. 28, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.recode.net/
2017/3/28/15079774/facebook-stories-snapchat-instagram-copy.
220. Quan-Haase & Wellman, supra note 203, at 126 (“[W]hat makes the
communication possibilities of the Internet unique are its capability to support
many-to-many information exchanges among geographically dispersed people.”).
221. Hampton & Wellman, supra note 203, at 303 (virtual networks were “especially useful in reducing barriers to collective action,” including organizing meetings, facilitating public engagement, and coordinating member participation in
political activities).
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each told us that they would never build another wired
neighborhood.222

As research consistently shows, such coordinated efforts help
to build trust and spur individuals to more collective action: that is,
it helps build social capital itself.223 Thus, the ability to coordinate
efforts that digital networks offer helps to not just encourage civic
engagement (one measure of the instantiation of social capital), but
can also strengthen networks and develop a reservoir of trust and
trustworthiness that creates capacities for more collective action in
the future, with that reservoir also serving as a manifestation of social capital.224
5. Offer New Modes of Engagement.
Digital networks, and the platforms on which they are built,
have also been shown to offer new modes of civil engagement.
With ease, individuals can communicate to other members of the
networks of which they are a part to urge them to utilize new means
of engagement, like sending an email to an elected official or signing an online petition: new modes of activism that mimic their analog corollaries but are far easier to utilize. Furthermore, new tools
also exist that networks can tap into, like the website Change.org
that facilitates the creation of online petitions, which users can then
circulate through their digital networks to recruit more petitioners
and strengthen the effect of the effort. Other digital tools that help
to spur coordination and cooperation are mechanisms like digital
scheduling, documents sharing platforms, polling, crowdfunding,
and crowdsourcing of messages and ideas.

222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Brehm & Rahm, supra note 26, at 1004–15 (describing relationship between social capital, civic engagement, and trust and how the increase in
one variable can positively influence the presence of others).
224. Research on the work of civic organizations in the United States revealed some of the benefits of their use of social media to promote collective action. Organizations surveyed stated that they used social media to interact with
and educate the public as well as to promote civic engagement and collective action, including through the circulation of petitions and facilitating communication
with elected officials. These efforts helped to create what the researchers described as a “unifying feedback loop” that enables groups to communicate with the
public in effective ways that assists in the coordination of collective efforts.
Jonathan A. Obar et al., Advocacy 2.0: An Analysis of How Advocacy Groups in
the United States Perceive and Use Social Media as Tools for Facilitating Civic Engagement and Collective Action, 2 J. INFO. POL’Y 1, 11–16 (2012).
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6. Amplify Network Effects.
By facilitating weak ties and assisting individuals to coordinate
cooperative action, digital networks help to create stronger network
effects because networks can grow in size and reach more easily
through digital networks than they can through traditional means.
Thus, the network effects of digital networks, which increase as a
network grows, are greater if digital tools help facilitate the reach of
those networks.
7. Lower Transaction Costs.
Probably at the heart of all of these findings is the fact that
digital tools help reduce the “friction” of communicating and coordinating along networks. Before the introduction of the telephone,
individuals needed to send a letter or telegram, or physically travel
along one’s personal network of friends or acquaintances. This
could be costly. For example, in the 1830s, sending a single-sheet
letter a few hundred miles would cost a nonfarm laborer between
one quarter and one third of his daily wage.225 Sending a telegram
would require going to a telegraph office and paying a telegraph
operator to send one’s message, with the expense prohibiting most
from sending messages that were not important.226 Today, one can
communicate with the members of one’s network effortlessly and
forward information to them, plan events, and communicate about
new forms of advocacy and engagement (like virtual town halls) all
with a few key strokes, and from the comfort of one’s home; while
spending time in a checkout line at the grocery store; or even waiting for the next free agent at the post office, presuming one still
goes to the post office!
Digital networks do more than facilitate coordination; they
make it easier to connect and coordinate.227 They help lower all of
the different classes of transaction costs identified by Coase: the
search for partners, the gathering of information about such potential partners, negotiation, and monitoring.228 Individuals looking to
225. DAVID M. HENKIN, THE POSTAL AGE: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 18 (2006).
226. TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE STORY
OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY’S ON-LINE PIONEERS 63
(1998) (describing cost-prohibitive nature of telegraphy).
227. On the role of social media in reducing the transaction costs associated
with coordinated action, see, e.g., HELEN MARGETTS ET AL., POLITICAL TURBULENCE: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA SHAPE COLLECTIVE ACTION 196–197 (2016).
228. Coase, supra note 56, at 390–92. As Benkler explains:
[The] basic change in the material conditions of information and cultural
production and distribution have substantial effects on how we come to
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make connections with others for business relations look to the
website LinkedIn for information about potential business partners
and hope to identify personal ties to such partners: i.e., the extent
to which one might be able to activate a weak tie to facilitate communication with that individual. For better or worse, employers
and even colleges are viewing individuals’ social media profiles to
learn a little more about those individuals.229
In addition to using digital networks to find information about
those on the network, individuals are also using digital tools to
make credible commitments, like agreeing to participate in demonstrations;230 recording that one has signed a petition and urging
others to do the same; or showing some form of proof that one has
voted, even if it just means circulating a “selfie” at the polling station or with an “I voted” sticker.231
Digital tools also allow for other forms of punishment for conduct in another that one finds offensive, like digital banishment
through “unfriending,” removing someone from a network, or using
digital tools to shame non-cooperative behavior. The viral nature
of videos promoted through social media, and the power they hold
in terms of stimulating and rewarding desired actions and punishing
disfavored behavior, cannot be overstated.232 Just ask United Airlines whether its leadership regrets that it cooperated with law enknow the world we occupy and the alternative courses of action open to
us as individuals and social actors. Through these effects, the emerging
networked environment structures how we perceive and pursue core values in modern liberal societies. BENKLER, supra note 195, at 30.
229. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, They Loved Your G.P.A. Then They Saw Your
Tweets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013) (describing phenomenon of colleges making
admissions decisions and employers making hiring decisions through searches on
social media).
230. See, e.g., Perry Stein, The Woman Who Started the Women’s March with
a Facebook Post Reflects: ‘It Was Mind-Boggling’, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2017/01/31/the-woman-whostarted-the-womens-march-with-a-facebook-post-reflects-it-was-mind-boggling/
?utm_term=.737f031c1c94 (describing origins of the Women’s March in January
2017).
231. Megan Farokhmanesh, The Positive Peer Pressure of the ‘I Voted’ Selfie,
VERGE (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/8/13552446/election-dayi-voted-sticker-selfie-social-media.
232. As an example, the so-called “Ice Bucket Challenge” became a viral sensation that was promoted through social media and raised $115 million to aid in
research into Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, more commonly known as “Lou
Gehrig’s Disease.” See, e.g., Hashem Koohy & Behrad Koohy, A Lesson from the
Ice Bucket Challenge: Using Social Networks to Publicize Science, 5 FRONTIERS
GENETICS 430 (2014); Katie Rogers, The ‘Ice Bucket Challenge’ Helped Scientists
Discover a New Gene Tied to ALS, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/health/the-ice-bucket-challenge-helped-scientistsdiscover-a-new-gene-tied-to-als.html.
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forcement to forcibly remove Dr. David Dao from an overbooked
flight. The video led to condemnation of the airline and a significant drop in its stock price, losing close to $1 billion in a matter of
hours in open trading.233 Bennett and Segerberg call this the “logic
of connective action”: digital tools enable the communication of
norms and the ready facilitation of coordinated action, disrupting
the free-rider calculus.234
8. Confluence of Forces: Trust and the Crowd.
When one combines several of these capacities of new digital
tools (namely, network effects, norm-generation, improved coordination of joint efforts, and disintermediation that leads to broad
engagement), one can leverage another force—the crowd—to create norms that are a product of an open process that draws from the
voices and perspectives of a wide range of opinions within a network. Network-generated norms and narratives are filtered
through digital tools and thus digital communication technologies
are nomosgenerative.
Because of the disintermediated nature of communications
within a network, which is a product of the new, digital tools at
members’ disposal, everyone can participate in this norm-generating process. This process is akin to the development of open source
software. When discussing the process by which such software is
generated, Eric Raymond used the metaphor of the cathedral versus the bazaar.235 In the cathedral, information and rules are generated in a top-down, vertical, and closed fashion: “carefully crafted
by individual wizards or small bands of mages working in splendid
isolation.”236 In the bazaar, by contrast, efforts of the crowd contribute in a horizontal way to the generation of the fruit of the network, with better outcomes.237 This same metaphor can apply in
the generation of norms. By utilizing digital tools, networks can
233. Dominic Rushe & David Smith, United Airlines CEO Offers Softer Apology After Stock Nosedives, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2017/apr/11/united-airlines-shares-plummet-passenger-removalcontroversy.
234. W. LANCE BENNETT & ALEXANDRA SEGERBERG, THE LOGIC OF CONNECTIVE ACTION: DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE PERSONALIZATION OF CONTENTIOUS
POLITICS 53 (2013).
235. ERIC. S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON
LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 21–22 (2001)
(describing metaphor of cathedral and the bazaar); id. at 49–54 (describing benefits of open-source approaches).
236. Id. at 20–21.
237. Id. at 21–22. Tufekci has called the leaderless organization of many technology-fueled protest movements “adhocracy.” TUFEKCI, supra note 218, at 53.
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harness the power of the crowd to generate effective and durable
norms that are the product of a disintermediated process in which
all members of the network have an opportunity to participate,
leading to greater trust in and compliance with those norms.238
***
Digital networks appear capable of creating networks and generating trust. In these ways, they appear to function in ways similar
to traditional social capital, creating synthetic social capital. In fact,
lowering the cost of communication and coordination may help to
generate network effects more powerfully than traditional social
capital. As a result, does this synthetic social capital stand in a better position, or at least a similar position, to that of traditional social
capital in terms of helping individuals and networks address collective action problems? It is to that question that I turn in the next
Part.
IV. CAN DIGITAL NETWORKS FACILITATE COOPERATION
ADDRESS COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS?

TO

As described above, research into the effect of digital networks
on social capital and related norms shows that digital networks can
help build weak ties, spread norms, enhance coordination, facilitate
new modes of engagement, amplify network effects, and lower
transaction costs. To the extent that these are the potential benefits
of digital networks, the presence of such benefits reveals that digital
networks could have a deep impact on the ability of communities to
solve collective action problems. Moreover, as the following discussion shows, such benefits are directly related to the theories about
what conditions and factors can create the trust and reciprocity necessary for cooperation designed to address social dilemmas. Since
addressing such problems requires community cooperation when
the benefits of digital networks can help to spur the trust that leads
to such cooperation, those networks hold out the possibility of creating the conditions necessary for realizing collective action designed to address collective problems, as the following discussion
shows.
238. For more on the value of crowdsourcing, or what Surowiecki calls “collective intelligence” and “the wisdom of crowds,” see SUROWIECKI, supra note 211,
at xiv. On the use of digital tools to engage in crowdsourcing, see JEFF HOWE,
CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE FUTURE OF
BUSINESS 14–15 (2008).
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A. Weak Ties.
As Granovetter argued nearly 50 years ago, one’s ability to improve one’s lot often depends on the “strength of weak ties”: i.e.,
one’s extended network of friends and acquaintances that one can
leverage for personal and mutual benefits.239 Weak ties are also
important when considering solving collective action problems.
Most collective action problems, to the extent they exist at all and
are true collective action problems, require some coordinated action among individuals who are not bound together through close
ties. One might picture one’s backyard as a kind of common pool
resource where all the members of a family can face the tragedy of
the commons if no one tends to the grass, keeps trash off of the
property, and maintains the lawn furniture. But it is the nature of a
problem that requires coordination beyond the close ties of a family
unit or a small, tightly knit group that makes it a collective action
problem in the first place.
Thus, true collective action problems require, by their nature, a
networked response that activates not just bonding social capital,
but also social capital of the bridging type. And if an existing network or networked superstructure connecting different networks
together does not exist, one needs to be created in order to coordinate a community-based response based on trust and reciprocity.
As we have seen, one of the strengths of digital networks is that
these networks enable the activation of otherwise latent weak ties.
Further, they help individuals cultivate norms of trust and reciprocity. They also lower social distance by giving individuals a means of
creating those connections and sharing communications that
strengthen those weak ties so that they can be leveraged for communal, coordinated activities if necessary.
B. Disintermediation and the Communication of Norms.
Disintermediation creates, in the words of Clay Shirky, the
power to organize without organizations.240 Furthermore, relying
on Ostrom’s design principle that members of a group should participate in rulemaking for the group,241 disintermediation places the
power of rule-setting and norm-setting in the individual members of
the group, often through the communication of symbols and stories.
This means the communications about acceptable and unacceptable
239. Granovetter, supra note 111, at 1377–78.
240. See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER
GANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS 47 (2008).
241. OSTROM, supra note 34, at 93.
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conduct—what it means to cooperate or defect—will be conveyed
by the individual members of the group, lending a legitimacy to
those communications.242 Those norms and rules do not emanate
from an authority figure that will enforce them through coercion.
Rather, they are made manifest through new, digital, disintermediated media, allowing all members of a group and network
to participate in the setting, amending, and conveying of norms.
This is a critical feature of cooperative endeavors.243
Because digital networks can make communication between
members or nodes of a digital network less costly and troublesome,
the ease with which one can communicate norms and narratives regarding trust and trustworthiness is high.244 This norm-generating
capacity is what, ultimately, gives these digital tools their nomosgenerative power.245 One of the norms that any network can
spread is the norm of civic engagement, lending support to notions
of trustworthiness: that one acts consistent with his or her credible
commitments. When contacts on a network all agree to take part in
coordinated action, communication about each contact’s efforts
consistent with that agreement can be distributed through the network. Individuals can tell stories about their activism. They can
share information about when they vote, their attendance at a political rally, or their contacts with elected officials. They can use social media to share blog posts, interesting news stories, or
compelling op-ed pieces. Information about the activities of different members of a network can spread norms about desired, common, and expected behavior of members in the network. Such
norms can spur the members of the network to act consistently with
those norms. Such norm-generative capacities are necessary for
collective action: the logic of reciprocity requires a shared understanding of when individuals are acting in a cooperative fashion.
242. A component of this legitimacy can be found in research on individuals’
perception of the legitimacy of judicial processes. When individuals have a voice
in judicial proceedings, they view the outcome of such processes as more legitimate. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 163 (2006); Stephanos
Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 949 (2006).
243. On the value of local participation and experimentation in setting rules
and policies, see, e.g., James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory
Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal
Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 183, 301–04 (2003).
244. See Kittilson & Dalton, supra note 214, at 640–41 (finding positive relationship between social media use and the formation of norms of civic
engagement).
245. For a discussion of the power of narrative to generate norms, see Cover,
supra note 1, at 4–5.
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Since that cooperative behavior can lead others to take similar,
trusting actions, creating virtuous cycles, communication regarding
the activities of the participants in a network is essential to trigger
positive, tit-for-tat actions, activating the logic of reciprocity. For
these reasons, digital networks are particularly well-suited to communicate norms, especially norms about cooperation geared toward
collective action.
C. New Capacities for Coordination and Engagement, which, in
Turn, Lead to Lowered Transaction Costs.
Digital social networks are not only well-suited to communicating norms, they can also facilitate coordinated action. Individuals
within a group that share emails, utilize text messages, or are connected through social media can leverage their connections to coordinate activities. Digital networks facilitate planning and
scheduling events and recruiting individuals to participate in them;
synchronizing actions, like a “Tweet storm” around an issue or an
effort to send consistent messages to an elected official; and raising
awareness about a particular issue and recruiting individuals to get
involved in activities centered around it. As the residents of
Netville showed, digital tools deployed by a digital social network
enabled the community to coordinate concerted action designed to
improve the lot of the residents. So, too, the last decade has seen
the rise of digital organizing that coordinates mass protests, from
Tunisia and Egypt, to the Occupy and Tea Party movements.246
Digital tools have also given network members new tools of
engagement, tools that often mimic time-honored methods for
sparking community activism. Online petitions, websites for
elected officials that accept communications from constituents, online newspapers, and media outlets that offer readers a chance to
submit comments on news stories or engage in online chats on topics of interest all serve as new means of engagement that simply
digitize traditional modes of civic engagement. These tools are evidence, at least according to some, of the presence of social capital.247 Furthermore, Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, and the internet
generally are new platforms for communication that enhance participants’ capacity for communication and coordinated action.
246. On the role of digital tools in these movements, see, for example,
TUFEKCI, supra note 218, at 3–27.
247. Javier Sajuria et al., Tweeting Alone? An Analysis of Bridging and Bonding Social Capital in Online Networks, 43 AMERICAN POL. RES. 708 (2015) (analyzing social media use during several political events and finding evidence that social
media can replicate social capital).

542

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:479

These new modes of engagement facilitate communications that
can contribute to a lowering of social distance and a widening of
one’s social circle and expansion of one’s weak ties. As a result,
they can enhance one’s social capital and, in turn, improve the possibility of coordinated, collective action.248 Just as social capital is
both a product of and produces trust, these new digital tools of engagement are both a means of cooperation and a product of it.
Many of these by-products of digital networks are, to a great
extent, the result of the fact that such networks allow for communication and coordinated action at extremely low cost. In the costbenefit analysis in traditional/analog collective action settings, the
effort required to build ties, communicate, and coordinate effort
can be high, particularly where it matters most: across weak ties.
Indeed, community organizing is hard. To paraphrase Oscar Wilde
and his complaint about Socialism: there are just too many night
meetings.249 Digital networks render the cost of communication
and coordinated action practically nil. While one certainly needs to
take the effort to engage in crafting messages, harmonizing schedules, and organizing activities, the act of communicating—which is
the essence of coordinated action and which, itself, leads to the possibility of more coordinated action as such communication, spreads
norms, builds trust, and lowers social distance—costs next to nothing.250 Looking back to Olson’s Logic, one of the likely drivers of
the free rider problem is a cost-benefit analysis that tells the shirker
248. On the effects of communication on cooperation, see generally Donna
M. Desforges et al., Effects of Structured Cooperative Contact on Changing Negative Attitudes Toward Stigmatized Social Groups, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 531 (1991). See also John M. Orbell et al. Explaining Discussion-Induced Cooperation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811–19 (1988) (finding
communication increases cooperation in cooperation games); Sally, supra note 41,
at 78 (same).
249. Oscar Wilde famously quipped: “The trouble with Socialism is that it
takes too many evenings.” JEDEDIAH PURDY, FOR COMMON THINGS: IRONY,
TRUST, AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICA TODAY 68 (2010) (quoting Wilde).
250. As Benkler explains: “[E]merging models of information and cultural
production, radically decentralized and based on emergent patterns of cooperation
and sharing, but also of simple coordinate coexistence, are beginning to take on an
ever-larger role in how we produce meaning—information, knowledge, and culture—in the networked information economy.” BENKLER, supra note 195, at
32–33. Tufekci warns that in social movements the ease of coordination and the
adhocracy that might unfold can sometimes threaten the durability and sustainability of movements over time as the capacity for trust and adaptable decision
making does not emerge through the work of dialogue and compromise that often
accompanies grassroots organizing. TUFEKCI, supra note 218, at 269–70. This phenomenon is not slacktivism, but something else. However, it’s risks can be minimized through greater attention to trust building and the lowering of social
distance.
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he or she should expend effort to gain the benefits of the coordinated efforts of others. Such an analysis of the costs of collective
action leads to a downward spiral of non-cooperation until there
are not enough cooperators to garner the benefits of collective action. Once the cost of participation and coordination is reduced, it
can lower the risk of free riding.251
Admittedly, one of the dangers of creating a near cost-less environment is that individuals may only take those actions that require little effort. This can mask the free rider from her own
feelings that she is, in fact, playing the part of free rider by encouraging minimal, low-cost actions that will likely have little impact.
Indeed, such cost-less efforts are unlikely to lead to solutions to
true collective action dilemmas. Such low transaction costs can lead
to what some might call “slacktivism”: one feels one is playing
one’s part for the collective effort by doing no more than sending a
Tweet, posting something on Facebook, or “liking” a webpage.252
One’s pangs of guilt that arise by playing the role of free rider can
be assuaged by the misplaced feeling that one is participating and
furthering the collective good. The effect of such efforts can lead to
the same sort of undermining of collective problem-solving that
mimics the effect of the free rider.253
Nevertheless, small steps toward cooperative behavior can enhance the capacity of networks to activate for larger-scale activities.
And the ability to establish that one is doing one’s part by taking
part in a rally, confronting an elected official, or voting, helps
spread norms of participation and cooperation. Thus, the normgenerating tools at one’s disposal through digital media enable a
network to overcome the conjoined free-rider and slacktivism
problems by spreading information about meaningful efforts carried out by some to further the interests of the many. This goads
251. For a discussion of the cost-benefit analysis that group members may
undertake when considering their participation in the group, see TYLER, supra
note 242, at 171.
252. See Clyde Haberman, Philanthropy That Comes From a Click, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/14/us/philanthropy-thatcomes-from-a-click.html (defining slacktivism).
253. For a discussion of the risks of slacktivism, see, for example, EVGENY
MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM, 189–91
(2011); Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be
Tweeted, NEW YORKER (Oct. 4, 2010), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/
10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell. Gladwell’s concerns with social media-fueled activism emerged shortly before the Arab Spring, which many saw as undermining his arguments. See, e.g., Bill Wasik, #Riot: Self-Organized, HyperNetworked Revolts—Coming to a City Near You, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2011), https://
www.wired.com/2011/12/ff_riots/.
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more cooperative behavior and shames the shirkers, who are unable to communicate similar efforts. Furthermore, the fact that actions—like communication and coordination—are easy, leaves the
“heavy lifting” for the things that are actually hard, like attending
rallies and face-to-face meetings, and embracing social movements
for change. By putting tools at the disposal of members of the community to coordinate and cooperate at relatively low-cost and with
relative ease, it enables them, in the words Yochai Benkler, to
“try[ ] to give meaning to their lives as individuals and as social
beings.”254
D. Network Effects and Crowdsourcing.
Network effects come about when networks grow. Because
digital networks facilitate the development of bridging social capital, enhance the ability of individuals to communicate along the networks they create, and strengthen the capacity of individuals to
coordinate network members to engage in cooperative action, they
also create conditions in which networks can increase in both number and strength.255 Networks can expand in number simply because the ability to activate otherwise latent weak ties, or to create
entirely new ones, offers individuals the capacity to increase the
number of individuals within a network. Furthermore, more communication—about norms, about mundane things—helps to lower
social distance and enhances the capacity for cooperation. Coordinated actions that are a product of activism along a digital network
whet the appetite for more coordinated action. All of these forces
not only amplify the network, but also the network effects that network generates.
Finally, because digital social networks can leverage network
effects, they are disintermediated in nature, they often have a democratic/horizontal structure, they possess a norm-generative capacity to shape the rules by which the network’s members will conduct
themselves, and they can benefit from the insights of many voices
and perspectives. Because the cost of participation and norm generation, through the communication of symbols and narratives easily through digital means, is low, and all members of the network
have the capacity to assist in the shaping of those norms, the norms
that ultimately flow from this nomosgenerative process have the
potential to draw from the wisdom of the crowd and produce norms
254. BENKLER, supra note 195, at 34.
255. BENNETT & SEGERBERG, supra note 234, at 33 (arguing that with digital
networks, “the strategic work of brokering and bridging coalitions between organizations with different standpoints and constituencies becomes central”).
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of cooperation that everyone has helped to shape. This broad participation likely means the final product is both a reflection of the
interests and needs of the group as a whole, and the norms that
emerge are likely more durable and more likely to lead to compliance because of the role that a network’s members played in their
generation.256
We see this phenomenon play out in various settings, like
where local governments have adopted a process known as participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting is where civic engagement leads to trust in the process as well as greater social capital in
the community and an enhanced desire and capacity among residents to engage in more civic activities moving forward. In participatory budgeting, citizens work with local elected leaders
through a crowdsourcing process to identify priorities, engage in
discussions about those priorities, and decide on which programs to
support with government funding. Research shows that this process
not only builds legitimacy and wide support for the ultimate decisions of the group (even those an individual citizen may not have
supported), but also builds trust in collective efforts and government and whets the appetite for more such civic engagement, even
in groups and individuals traditionally marginalized from government and civic actions.257
***
As I hope the previous discussion shows, new, digital tools
seem to hold out the promise that individuals in networks can overcome some of the challenges of collective action—most notably the
cost of participation, the dilemma of coordination, the difficulty of
bridging and activating weak ties, and the problem of engagement
and inclusiveness in norm generation and norm diffusion. What is
more, by extending the capacity of networks to link with other networks so as to grow in size and power by activating network effects,
256. See Sabel, Constitutional Ordering, supra note 157, at 92–94 (describing
trust-building effects of collaborative decision-making and monitoring in network
settings).
257. See, e.g., Josh Lerner & Daniel Shugurensky, Who Learns What in Participatory Democracy? Participatory Budgeting in Rosario, Argentina, in DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES AS LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES 85–191 (Ruud van der Veen et
al. eds., 2007) (describing impact of participatory budgeting on civic engagement in
Rosario, Argentina). For a description of participatory budgeting as it is functioning in many communities in New York City, see Celina Su, Renegotiating the Constituent’s Role in Urban Governance: Participatory Budgeting in New York City, in
HOW CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD: URBAN INNOVATION IN THE FACE OF POPULATION FLOWS, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 233 (Ray Brescia
& John Travis Marshall eds., 2016).
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digital tools hold out the promise that they can increase the impact
associated with network activities. Digital tools can harness this
new, synthetic social capital in ways that help networks and communities address social dilemmas and collective action problems in
coordinated, engaged, and engaging ways. By no means is such an
outcome from the use of digital tools path dependent. Indeed, as
Tufekci’s work on the weakening of digitally enhanced network social movements over the last decade reveals, sustained, successful
civic engagement is a product of effective networks that harness the
social capital they create and direct it toward continuing, coordinated action.258 As she explains, group “gains in resilience and collective decision-making and acting capacity that emerge from the
long-term work of negotiation and interaction” help “maintain the
networks as functioning and durable social and political structures.”259 Similarly, the success of Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign
for the presidency engaged a new generation of grassroots activists,
using new, digital tools,260 but little effort was undertaken to create
a lasting infrastructure that could activate this network for ongoing
and coordinated efforts moving forward.261
Nevertheless, despite these apparent failures of digital tools to
help spur sustained cooperation and civic engagement, by helping
networks and communities recalibrate the calculus of collective action, digital tools may offer the potential and create capacities for
coordinated collective action in the service of solving some of the
world’s most dire threats. That is, provided there is attention to
building on the trust and social capital that can evolve from initial,
trusting engagement. In the end, by facilitating the communication
of narratives of trust and the generation of nomoi and networks
that trust and cooperate, digital tools can, in the end, assist communities in forming in ways that foster improved coordination in the
service of the collective good.
Of course, as recent failures to spark such sustained activities
reveal, digital tools alone will not generate such civic engagement;
on the other hand, careful attention to the curation of trust, civic
connections, weak ties, crowdsourcing, and cooperative norm generation, all made possible through digital capacities, holds out hope
258. See TUFEKCI, supra note 218, at 268–72.
259. Id. at 269–270.
260. On the 2008 Obama Campaign’s use of new computing powers and digital tools in campaign coordination and organizing, see SASHA ISSENBERG, THE
VICTORY LAB: THE SECRET SCIENCE OF WINNING CAMPAIGNS 246–71 (2012).
261. Micah L, Sifry, Obama’s Lost Army, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 9, 2017).
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that coordinated, collective action is possible to address the social
dilemmas of today and those that will inevitably arise in the future.
CONCLUSION
In myriad ways, new, digital networks are enabling individuals
and communities to occupy a nomos—a normative universe—of
their own creation. In that universe, they do not just choose the
other members to inhabit it with them, they also transmit norms
and meanings, cooperate, deceive, defect, collaborate, monitor,
shirk, and share. These communities exist in the virtual world but
have real world implications. They hold out promise that they can
encourage collaboration and cooperation, facilitate coordinated action, encourage trust and trustworthiness, and replicate social capital, albeit in a synthetic form. But this synthetic social capital seems
to generate many of the same capacities as “real” social capital.
This is so even though, as we have seen, social capital does not exist
within an individual—it is in his or her relationships, which are ineffable and difficult to measure their own.262 Indeed, social capital is
intangible, a product of relationships developed in networks. It
manifests itself in concrete action—a trusting move, a cooperative
gesture—but it is itself nothing more than the ties that bind and
energize, activate and inspire, monitor and trust.
I have tried to show here that digital tools have the capacity to
foster trust, trustworthiness, and social capital. They help make
meaning, form community, and coordinate action and cooperation.
And they do so in ways that are far easier and less costly than traditional means of doing the same. Those traditional means can generate the friction that leads to non-cooperative choices. Digital
tools thus generate many of the same benefits, and do so with
greater ease, as traditional means of building social capital. Thus,
digital tools can help serve a critical function in harnessing social
capital to generate trust and trustworthiness in the service of solving collective action problems.
A decade before the introduction of the iPhone, in May of
1997, IBM’s Deep Blue computer defeated Garry Kasparov in a
262. Fukuyama, Social Capital, supra note 58, at 9 (noting absence of consensus on how to measure social capital). As one can imagine, assessing the creation
of social capital through digital means is no less troubling. For a discussion of ways
to develop metrics for assessing the presence or absence of social capital, see generally Dmitri Williams, On and Off the ‘Net: Scales for Social Capital in an Online
Era, 11 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 593 (2006) (offering methods for measuring presence of bridging and bonding social capital in digital settings).
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series of chess matches.263 Since that time, teams of human chess
players aided by computers—so-called “centaurs” in the common
parlance—have gone on to take top prizes in many chess
matches.264 The combination of human intuition and machine
learning, Big Data, and computational firepower, has proven hard
to defeat. This has led Brynjolfsson and McAfee to proclaim that
racing “with the machines” as opposed to running against them or
without them is going to prove a critical strategy in contemporary
life.265 This has particular salience when considering the many collective action problems the world faces. While it may seem a
stretch to analogize a chess match to a collective action problem,
this Article has tried to introduce the notion that digitally enhanced
and computer-assisted communities can come together in better
and strategic ways to build trust, encourage trustworthiness, create
social capital, and, ultimately, solve social dilemmas.
Although many may decry our new, digitally connected life as
one in which traditional interpersonal bonds are eschewed for
weaker, virtual connections, I have tried to show here that it is
those weak, digital ties that can (but by no means must) ultimately
lead to richer, democratic narratives and deeper, more durable
norms of collaboration, community and cooperation sufficient to
encourage communities to address collective action problems in
new, creative, and constructive ways. Digital ties can also allow individuals to pursue what Tocqueville called their “self-interest well
understood.”266
New technological tools appear available to help individuals
work collectively toward their common goals and pursue their selfinterest to positive, collective ends. We will both shape and be
shaped by these technologies should we make choices about their
use that help further positive, collective ends that we might not be
able to achieve on our own, acting individually. McLuhan claimed
that “in the normal use of technology,” humans are “perpetually
modified by it and in turn find[ ] ever new ways of modifying
263. Charles Krauthammer, Be Afraid: The Meaning of Deep Blue’s Victory,
WKLY. STANDARD (May 26, 1997). For a first-person account of Kasparov’s loss to
Big Blue, see GARRY KASPAROV, DEEP THINKING: WHERE MACHINE INTELLIGENCE ENDS AND HUMAN CREATIVITY BEGINS 167–96 (2017).
264. KEVIN KELLY, THE INEVITABLE: UNDERSTANDING THE 12 TECHNOLOGICAL FORCES THAT WILL SHAPE OUR FUTURE 41 (2016) (describing success of
computer-assisted centaur teams in chess competitions).
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[it].”267 Like most technologies, digital tools of communication can
be harnessed for constructive or destructive ends; what I have tried
to show here is that they offer individuals and communities the
means of promoting collaboration and cooperation in the service of
human advancement. These individuals and communities must
choose the ways in which such tools will be used and for what ends.
The dilemmas exist, are real, and will require community engagement and cooperation to solve them. It is my hope that the strength
of digital ties will help overcome some of the obstacles to such
efforts.

267. MCLUHAN, supra note 184, at 46.
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